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ABSTRACT 
 The following thesis is an examination of the Thirty Years’ War.  This conflict, 
from 1618-1648 in the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,” was the 
culminating conflict of the Reformation era and set the stage for the modern world.  
Much scholarly debate in recent years has centered on whether or not the Thirty Years’ 
War was a “religious” conflict.  A great deal of recent work has tended to minimize or 
discount the religious element of the conflict.   
 This current thesis attempts to engage this debate and to argue that the war’s 
origins did indeed lie in religious concerns.  This is so because the Thirty Years’ War was 
the final conflict necessitated by the Reformation challenges to the church-state nexus of 
Corpus Christianum (Christendom).  The war was the final struggle for the shape and 
future of Christendom and its origins were decidedly religious.  Yet, as this work shows, 
its effects were, paradoxically, the birth of the “irreligion” of the Enlightenment era as 
well as the launch of the ascendancy of nation-state structures and concerns in early 
modern Europe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The series of interrelated conflicts, which engulfed most of the powers of 
Continental Europe from 1618-1648, has come to be known as the Thirty Years’ War. 
The setting for the conflict was the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” 
(primarily the portions comprising modern-day Germany and the Czech Republic). Over 
the course of thirty years, Protestant rulers and armies from Germany, Sweden, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands clashed with the Catholic militaries of the Habsburg monarchy 
(German and Spanish). Additionally, Roman Catholic France would become a dominant 
participant in the second half of the war.  
 At first glance, this would seem to be the final conflict in a series of “wars of 
religion” flowing from the splintering of Christendom due to the Protestant Reformation. 
As Peter H. Wilson remarks, “The assumption that the Thirty Years’ War had been a 
religious conflict seemed so self-evident it was scarcely questioned.”1 For years, the 
scholarly and popular consensus characterized the Thirty Years’ War as a devastating 
religious conflict which so exhausted the resources of Christianity in the West that it 
ushered in the modern era of the secular nation-state. While this view is still widespread, 
many scholars since the latter part of the twentieth century have asserted that the Thirty 
Years’ Wars was, in actual fact, primarily a political conflict based around objections to 
imperial Habsburg rule. Thomas Cahill echoes the recent trend away from religious 
causation when he writes that the Thirty Years’ War involved “most of Europe in bloody 
disputes over religion and territory – or, rather, starting with religion and ending in 
territory, ending indeed in 1648 with no one among the exhausted combatants able to 
                                                 
 
1
 Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War: Europe’s Tragedy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press, 2009), 7. 
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articulate persuasively why they had been fighting each other for thirty years. … With 
few exceptions, the results established the map of Europe as it stands today. But no one 
will ever be able to begin to account for the blood that was shed.”2 
 Certainly, any examination of the Thirty Years’ War does cause one to wonder at 
the shocking brutality and seeming senselessness of so many aspects of the conflict. 
Nonetheless, it is important for the church historian to seek to understand the origins and 
effects of this war. The answers to questions of cause and effect are important for 
understanding the history of modern Europe as well as the history and influence of 
Christianity in the wider Western world. The goal of this thesis is to clarify, as much as 
possible, the causal factors leading up to the Thirty Years’ War as well to elucidate the 
effects of this conflict in regard to the relationship between religion (Christianity) and the 
European/Western world. 
 There is nothing like a “scholarly consensus” on the origins and effects of the 
Thirty Years’ War.  However, a trend toward secularizing the conflict has emerged in 
20
th
 and 21
st
 century scholarship.  Writing in 1938, C.V. Wedgwood typified the still 
widely held view that the conflict’s origins were primarily religious/confessional, with 
geopolitical causes stemming from the destabilization of Corpus Christianum
3
 during the 
Protestant Reformation remaining secondary. More recently (1984, 1997), Geoffrey 
Parker has led a team of scholars in producing a survey of the Thirty Years’ War which 
has sought to place the conflict in an international setting with emphasis on hybrid origins 
                                                 
 
2
 Thomas Cahill, Heretics and Heroes: How Renaissance Artists and Reformation Priests Created 
Our World (New York: Doubleday/Nan A. Talese, 2013), 286. [emphasis added] 
 
 
3
 This term means the “Christian body” and is equivalent to what is more commonly referred to as 
“Christendom.”  It is the name for the melding of church and state under the leadership of the Roman 
Catholic Church and an emperor or rulers loyal to Rome. This essay will use significant space to examine 
the roots and significance of Corpus Christianum as it relates to the origins of the Thirty Years’ War.  
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in imperial policy disputes and religious affection/confession. Of late, the analyses of 
scholars such as Peter H. Wilson have sought to further diminish the religious dimension. 
Wilson has argued that the Thirty Years’ War was not a religious conflict at all, except in 
the sense that everyone in the 17
th
 century was religious. Instead, he has declared that the 
conflict was rooted in the problems inherent to the Imperial constitution. 
 With this divergence of opinion, it is easily seen that the way in which one 
understands the role of Christian faith in the Thirty Years’ War is a crucial question. 
Contrary to the course of modern scholarship which has tended to increasingly secularize 
the conflict; this thesis will argue that its beginnings do indeed lie in religion. More 
specifically, the case will be made that the war’s origins lie in the Western world’s 
particular application of Christianity through a dominant conceptual and practical 
framework known as Corpus Christianum or Christendom.  
 In addition to examining the critical analysis of its causes, attention will be given 
to examining the lasting effects of the war for religion/Christianity in the West. For, 
while it is correct that the origins of the Thirty Years’ War lie deeply in religious 
concerns, it is equally true that the results of this conflict mark out the beginnings of 
Christianity’s decline in the Western World over the last three and a half centuries. Many 
of the themes of the Enlightenment and the secularization of society and government 
were foreshadowed and/or born in the outcomes of the Thirty Years’ War. 
 To proceed with the above argument, this treatise will progress along the 
following lines. The first section is a general introduction. Next, in part one, a thorough 
historical examination of the concept of Corpus Christianum will set the stage for 
understanding the way that religion/Christianity was envisioned and practiced leading up 
4 
 
to the Protestant Reformation. In this examination, it will quickly become apparent that 
the Reformation could never have been merely an intellectual, theological dispute; rather, 
it was nothing less than a reconceptualization of the entirety of socio-cultural norms and 
political structures. This revision would have devastating consequences for the “Holy 
Roman Empire of the German Nation” and would affect all of Europe by inaugurating the 
great military conflict engulfing it from 1618-1648.  
 Part two begins with a representative summary of scholarly views on the origins 
of the Thirty Years’ War. It continues as a brief survey of the conflict proper, followed by 
an examination of the specific religious issues present in each period. Additionally, part 
two is a necessary and useful transition toward the final phase of this thesis. One of the 
truly fascinating aspects of the Thirty Years’ War is that while it can be divided up ad 
infinitum by examining its various regional struggles, “the most important chronological 
division is a relatively easy one: the period of the war before 1631; and the second phase 
of the war, between 1631 and 1648.”4 The first phase is most distinctly rooted in religion. 
The second phase, especially after France’s formal involvement from 1634/35 onward, is 
when it became increasingly clear that the splintering of Christendom would ultimately 
mean the splintering of the religious, Christian vision for society. Thus, part two of this 
thesis is not only useful for seeing the essential religious nature of the war, especially in 
its beginnings; it is also important for understanding that the shifting focus in the latter 
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 Richard Bonney, Essential Histories: The Thirty Years’ War 1618-1648 (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2002), 7. 
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stages of the war would commence the decline of not only Corpus Christianum but of 
Christian faith in the Western world.
5
 
 Part three will focus on the end of the war as formalized in the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648) along with an examination of the results for the Habsburg dynasty and 
the various state powers of Europe. Special attention will be given in this section to the 
wider context of a now recognizably “modern” Europe. In the aftermath of the Thirty 
Years’ War, the political map was radically redrawn. Also, the spiritual mold of Europe 
had been recast. State churches and significantly “Christianized” societies did continue in 
the Western world. However, never again would there be anything like Christendom as it 
had existed from the latter stages of the Roman Empire up through the Reformation 
period. Soon, the Enlightenment would hold sway and national identity would become 
ascendant. Finally, the last section will bring a conclusion to this examination. 
 
  
                                                 
 
5
 This statement may seem prima facie false, especially when one considers the amazing periods 
of Evangelical revival in the First and Second Great Awakenings. However, it is the opinion of this author 
that the virtual collapse of Christendom at the end of the Thirty Years’ War is the commencement point for 
the growing secularization of the Western world and for the eventual, radical separation of church and state 
which is seen in nearly all Western countries today. 
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PART 1 
THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND  
OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 
 The dominant vision of human life – the religio-socio-political ether – in the 
Western world at the time of the Reformation, and even still at the outset of the Thirty 
Years’ War was Christendom. Hermann Dooyeweerd gives a concise and helpful 
definition for this concept: 
 In the dominant medieval conception there was one great community of 
Christendom, the corpus christianum [the “Christian body”]. The pope was its 
spiritual head while the emperor was its worldly head. Their relation was not 
analogous to the modern relation between church and state, for a differentiated 
body politic did not exist … National differentiation was largely unknown. The 
fact that the substructure was undifferentiated enabled the church of that time 
period to control the whole of cultural life.
6
 
 
 This definition helps to explain why the roots of the Thirty Years’ War cannot possibly 
be viewed in merely secular terms. Instead, it was the culmination of the religio-social, 
political upheaval brought on by the Protestant Reformation. Christendom was religion 
and politics and culture. To see its importance for the origins of the conflict under 
examination, a brief survey of its development from the latter stages of the Roman 
Empire up to its role in the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” is in order. 
Corpus Christianum: The Religious, Social, and Political Framework of the West 
from Constantine to the Reformation 
Constantine and the Christianization of the Roman Empire 
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 Herman Dooyeweerd, Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular, and Christian Options 
(Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1979), 76.  
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 After years of intermittent and sometimes brutal persecution at the hands of the 
Roman Empire, the Christian church happily embraced the newly Christian(ized) 
Emperor, Constantine. After conquering his rival Maxentius in 312 under the “sign of the 
cross,” Constantine officially ended Christian persecution in 313.  
 Yet, he was not done. According to Eusebius, Constantine was God’s instrument 
to bring about a Christianized Roman Empire – an agent to meld together religion and 
state, Christianity and empire.
7
 Routinely criticized by modern voices as a religious 
impostor, Constantine’s first official acts as sole emperor were to refuse to enter the 
Capitolium and sacrifice to Jupiter, and to unveil a political theology in which he was in 
“opposition to sacrifice.”8 In fact, “when Constantine’s Arch was unveiled three years 
after he took Rome, the emperor was depicted not facing Jupiter but with his back to the 
god.”9  
 The Christian devotion of Constantine can be debated. However, there is no doubt 
that Christianity was being fused with the life of the Rome. Van Leeuwen remarks: 
“Originally the Roman cult of state was centered in the king, who united in his person all 
                                                 
 
7
 Eusebius, The Church History, trans. Paul L. Maier (Grand Rapids: Kregel Academic & 
Professional, 2007 [original publication – ca. 324-325]). For instance, Eusebius writes on pg. 332: “His 
enemy prostrate, the mighty victor Constantine, outstanding in every virtue godliness confers, as well as his 
son Crispus, a ruler most dear to God and like his father in every way, won back their own eastern 
provinces and combined the Roman Empire into a single whole, as in former days, bringing it all under 
their peaceful rule … And so all tyranny was eradicated, and the kingdom that was theirs was preserved, 
secure and undisputed, for Constantine and his sons alone. They, having first cleansed the world of hatred 
to God and knowing all the good He had conferred on them, showed their love of virtue and of God, their 
devotion and gratitude to the Almighty, by their actions for all to see.”  
 
 
8
 Peter Leithart, Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom 
(Grand Rapids: IVP Academic, 2010), 66-67.  
 
 
9
 Ibid., 67.  
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political and sacral functions.”10 Under Constantine, the political and sacral functions 
were progressively Christianized and Corpus Christianum was born. 
Augustine: Two Cities in Theory, Christendom in Practice 
 As Christendom progressed it also suffered a great challenge: “With … Emperor 
Theodosius’ banning of other cults in 391, many Christians in Augustine’s time dared to 
hope … that there would be a Christian Empire obeying and fulfilling God’s will on 
Earth directly. … The sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 dashed such hopes.”11 
 The challenge of answering Christian concerns and pagan criticism in light of this 
sudden reversal fell to the great bishop and theologian Augustine of Hippo. He responded 
with his magnum opus, De Civitate Dei, “On the City of God.” In this masterwork, 
Augustine espoused his doctrine of the “city of God” (civitas Dei) and the “city of earth” 
(civitas terrena): “Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by 
the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to 
the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord.”12  
 Essentially, Augustine developed a theory which rejected the fusion of church and 
state. Again, van Leeuwen’s comments are helpful: “Although he gives Christiana 
tempora their due and sincerely admits that the conversion of the emperor and the 
abolition of the pagan state cult were both important events, he never speaks of a 
Christian empire.”13 
                                                 
 
10
 Arend Th. van Leeuwen, Christianity in World History, trans. H.H. Hoskins (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 273.  
  
 
11
 Kim Paffenroth, Introduction to St. Augustine. The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: 
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2006 [originally published ca. 412-426]), xiv.  
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 St. Augustine, The City of God, 14.28 (pg. 569).  
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 Van Leeuwen, Christianity in World History, 280.  
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 Nevertheless, theory and practice often differ. So they did for one considered the 
father of the Western church. In a letter (ca. 408) to a Donatist bishop, Vincentius, 
Augustine defended the right of civil powers to work with the church to compel heretics 
and sinners to re-enter the fold of God:  
  For originally my opinion was that no one should be coerced into the unity 
of Christ, that we must act only by words, fight only by arguments and prevail by 
force of reason, … But this opinion of mine was overcome not by the words of 
those who controverted it, but by the conclusive instances to which they could 
point. For in the first place there was set over against my opinion my own town, 
which, although it was once wholly on the side of Donatus, was brought over to 
the Catholic unity by fear of the imperial edicts.
14
  
 
 Though Augustine masterfully laid out a theology of “two cities formed by two 
loves,” he repeatedly leaned toward a central role for the state in reclaiming heretics and 
the impenitent.
15
 There is no doubt that Augustine’s motives in this use of the state were 
noble: to rescue, by punishment, those who had far worse coming to them in the afterlife 
if they were not reclaimed for God and His church. Nonetheless, Augustine’s theory was 
overridden by his application of it, and this represented a further step toward the merging 
of church and state.
16
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 St. Augustine, “Letter 93.” In From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political 
Thought, ed. Oliver O’ Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’ Donovan (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman’s 
Publishing Co., 1999), 132.  
 
 
15
 For instance, not only did Augustine respond to the Donatists as in Letter 93, he also, in writing 
to a civil magistrate named Macedonius in what we know as Letter 153 (ca. 414), again defended the use of 
civil punishments for reclaiming the fallen from the church. Also, in Letter 189 (ca. 418) to Count 
Boniface, he defended a form of “just war theory” by saying that the Christian could, with clear conscience, 
serve in the military. 
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 Sadly, many modern historians – particularly at the popular level – have not been kind: 
“Augustine, for all his greatness, has become in old age the type of the evil cleric, full of mercy for those 
who fear him, full of seething contempt for those who dare oppose him, scheming to make common cause 
with Babylon and whatever state-sponsored cruelty will, in the name of Order, suppress his opposition. 
There is not a country in the world today that does not still possess a few examples of the type.” Thomas 
Cahill, How the Irish Saved Civilization: The Untold Story of Ireland’s Heroic Role from the Fall of Rome 
to the Rise of Medieval Europe. (New York: Anchor Books, 1995), 67.  
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The Decline and Rise of Rome 
 Over the centuries following Augustine, the Western Roman Empire, centered in 
the city of Rome, continued to experience decline. It was in the Eastern Empire, with its 
new imperial capital of Constantinople, that a vision of a city of God on earth under an 
imperial representative of God on earth would move forward: “A Christian emperor, 
ruling as the sponsor and protector of the Church, could serve not merely as Christ’s ally 
in the great war against evil, but as His representative on earth, ‘directing, in imitation of 
God Himself, the administration of the world’s affairs.’”17  
 Yet, the idea of Corpus Christianum in the West did not disappear, it merely 
changed. In the late 6
th
 and early 7
th
 centuries, Pope Gregory I was ruling in Rome. A 
man known for humility as well as skill and learning, Gregory is “reputed to be the 
theoretical founder, along with Cassiodorus and Isidore, of Christian ‘Romano-
Germanic’ kingship.”18 In many respects, Gregory and the popes after him had little 
choice but to take on a dual role: “To some extent, the popes – the good ones, at least – 
would have no choice but to take on the role of emperor, certainly insofar as the 
protection of Italy was concerned.”19  
 In his growing power as the Pope, Gregory and those after him were merely 
beginning to exercise in a wider way the influence and primacy they had long held as 
bishops of the city of Rome. As early as CE 96, one early Roman abbot, Clement, had 
written to admonish the church at Corinth in a struggle they were having with deposing 
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 Tom Holland, The Forge of Christendom: The End of Days and the Epic Rise of the West (New 
York: Anchor Books, 2008), 7. Holland’s quotation comes from Eusebius in his Life of Constantine, 3.3.1.  
 
 
18
 Oliver O’ Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’ Donovan, eds. From Irenaeus to Grotius: A 
Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman’s Publishing Co., 1999), 195.  
 
 
19
 Thomas Cahill, Mysteries of the Middle Ages: The Rise of Feminism, Science, and Art from the 
Cults of Catholic Europe (New York: Doubleday/Nan A. Talese, 2006), 42.  
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some local presbyters. His letter ended with a command to “Be quick to return our 
delegates in peace and joy, Claudius Ephebus and Valerius Bito, along with Fortunatus. 
In that way they will the sooner bring us news of that peace we have prayed for and so 
much desire, and we in turn will the more speedily rejoice over your healthy state.” The 
growing influence of the bishop of Rome would grow into the papacy, an increasingly 
mixed role of spiritual and secular rule. In AD 800, this transformation and growing 
power would crown a Frankish king as “Holy Roman Emperor” and formalize Corpus 
Christianum in the West.  
Charlemagne and the Official Beginning of the “Holy Roman Empire” 
 During the period of growing separation between the churches and political 
structures of the Eastern and Western Roman Empire, new religio-political threats were 
also rising. Islam was a growing force, and it had begun to press at every point of the 
imperial borders. Eventually, Islamic expansion would conquer North Africa. This 
opened the way for Muslim forces to invade Spain and begin pressing toward Northern 
Europe. Additionally, Islamic expansion was also seeking inroads from the East. In this 
setting, the northern tribes of the old Roman Empire’s holdings began to take on greater 
importance. The papacy and church at Rome were forced to begin making alliances with 
Frankish and Germanic kings. Eventually, one great Frankish king would rise to the fore: 
Charles le magne (rough Latin for “the great”) or Charlemagne. 
 Charlemagne, and other Frankish kings before him, had long cooperated with and 
protected the Pope and Rome from military and political threats. In the summer of CE 
800, Charlemagne had come to Rome to defend Pope Leo III in the face of charges of 
corruption by Roman nobles. Charlemagne lingered in Rome until Christmas. Then, 
12 
 
while Charles went to the basilica of St. Peter to worship mass on Christmas Day, he 
kneeled to pray before the tomb of the apostles. Mark Noll describes what happened next 
as he rose from his knees:  
 As he did so, Pope Leo III advanced, and in the words of an eyewitness, “the 
venerable holy pontiff with his own hands crowned Charles with a most precious 
crown.” Then the people – in fact, ‘all the Roman people,’ according to the annals 
of the Franks – arose as one. They had been told what to say; three times a great 
shout rang out: “Carolo Augusto of Deo coronato, magna et pacific imperatori, 
vita et victoria” (To Charles Augustus, crowned by God, great and peace-giving 
emperor of the Romans, life and victory).
20
 
 
 What this moment represented was the result of all the moves toward 
Christendom that had been made up to this point. The concept and outworking of Corpus 
Christianum was largely crystallized in this moment. The synthesis and cooperation 
which came from this culminating act, “symbolized … an integrated view of life in which 
everything – politics, social order, religious practice, economic relationships, and more – 
was based on the Christian faith as communicated by the Roman Catholic Church and 
protected by the actions of secular rulers.”21  
 This would be the dominant religio-social and political framework that endured 
up to the Protestant Reformation. This “medieval synthesis” inserted the Roman Catholic 
Church into politics and daily life and also injected the concerns of state and empire into 
the church. Again, Noll is helpful in summarizing the significance of what this would 
come to mean: 
 With its central sacramental role in the salvation of sinners, the church also 
assumed immense significance for every other aspect of culture. Since the 
salvation of sinners is the most important imaginable task in life, leaders of the 
political sphere must cooperate with the church as it fulfills its spiritual tasks; 
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 Mark A. Noll, Turning Points: Decisive Moments in the History of Christianity (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2000), 108-109.  
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 Ibid., 122.  
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those who exercise the mind must direct learning in ways that are compatible with 
church teaching; economic relationships should be structured to support the 
church in its mission; and ideals for social order will naturally imitate patterns 
that God has set out for the church. In other words, with the widespread 
agreement that salvation was the most important reality, and the further agreement 
that salvation was communicated through and by the sacraments, it had to follow 
that the church, as the administrator of the sacraments, should offer a foundation 
for everything else.
22
 
 
Thus, with the solidification of Christendom, the entire pattern of medieval life was set. 
This pattern and its influence on all of Western European life would continue, with only 
minor adjustments, until the cosmos-shaking events of the Reformation. 
The Rise of a Germanic “Holy Roman Empire” 
 Under Charlemagne, a period of cultural and spiritual renewal would begin 
known as the Carolingian Renaissance. However, though Charlemagne was a great ruler, 
his empire was vast and the structures that supported it were not well developed. In time, 
challenges from nomadic marauders, as well as the general ineffectiveness of 
Charlemagne’s heirs, would destabilize the Holy Roman Empire. This set the stage for 
the system known as feudalism. In this arrangement a powerful local ruler reigned as 
lord, while those who lived on and worked his land and holdings were his vassals. 
 Despite the continuing centrality of the Roman Catholic Church, it was also 
affected by feudal arrangements. The “state,” in the form of local rulers, began to 
exercise increased influence over the appointment of bishops and other church 
prerogatives. The involvement of the state further intensified as the title of Holy Roman 
Emperor shifted from Frankish to Germanic hands. This was particularly true under the 
Germanic king Otto the Great who revived the Holy Roman Empire in the West in 962: 
 Otto claimed to be the successor of Augustus, Constantine, and Charlemagne, 
although his actual power was confined to Germany and Italy. At first the papacy 
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looked to the German king for protection against the unruly Italian nobles who for 
a century had been making a prize of the papacy. From the church’s viewpoint, 
however, this arrangement had its drawbacks, for the Germanic kings continued 
to interfere in ecclesiastical affairs – even in the election of popes.23 
 
 In time, one would rise to the papacy who would challenge this intervention. Pope 
Gregory VII (1073-1085) formally outlawed the practice of “lay investiture,” or the 
granting of ecclesiastical office by non-church officials (i.e., Germanic kings/emperors). 
Eventually, the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV, contested this edict in an attempt to 
force the abdication of Gregory. However, Gregory took an “utterly unprecedented step 
[and] responded in ferocious kind. Henry’s subjects, the Pope had pronounced, were 
absolved from all their loyalty and obedience to their earthly lord – even as Henry 
himself, that very image of God on earth, was … excommunicated from the Church.”24  
 It was uncertain whether Henry would bow. In fact, he tried not to. Yet, without 
the support of the Roman Catholic Church, Henry was severely undermined as a “Holy 
Roman Emperor.” His nobles turned against him and Henry was forced to seek 
forgiveness from the Church. He knew that he had to intercept Pope Gregory VII and do 
penance, in the hopes that the Pope would change his mind. Eventually, Gregory and 
Henry met at the castle of Canossa. Morris Bishop describes the scene: “At Gregory’s 
order, Henry stood without in the January snows, barefoot, gowned in coarse penitent’s 
garb, and stripped of all his regalia. Gregory kept him there for three days and two nights 
until at last the pope, in Christian charity, deemed the humiliation the emperor had 
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suffered to be sufficient.”25 Of course, after Henry regained his power and grip over the 
German nobles, he again fought with Pope Gregory VII, and the papacy nearly came to 
ruin by the fourteenth century as rival popes fought for control of the Church. 
 Nonetheless, the incident at Canossa had moved the concept of Corpus 
Christianum even closer to the form it would take prior to the Reformation. The melding 
of church and state produced friction. At the end of the day, though, the church, with its 
hold on the sacraments and salvation, possessed the true power in the Holy Roman 
Empire. This was especially true as the ardently Roman Catholic Habsburg (also, 
Hapsburg and House of Austria) monarchy grabbed the reigns of leadership in the Holy 
Roman Empire. 
“The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” on the Cusp of the Reformation 
 Under the House of Austria, Corpus Christianum reached its apex. Hans 
Hillerbrand comments: “The house of Habsburg dominated German history from the late 
Middle Ages until the time of Napoleon in that most emperors during that time came 
from the house of Habsburg.”26 Yet, Christendom under the Habsburgs was also greatly 
challenged both by Protestant reforms and the opposition of Roman Catholic – but non-
Habsburg – France. Despite these obstacles, Corpus Christianum under the Habsburgs 
was the dominant reality of the Western world. 
 Over time the power of the House of Austria grew exponentially. In his masterful 
study of the Habsburgs, H.G. Koenigsberger summarized their role in European history: 
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 [F]or nearly one hundred and fifty years, from 1516 until 1659, it actually 
dominated European politics … It is not difficult to see how this dominance came 
about. Charles V’s inheritance of the crowns of four major dynasties, Castile, 
Aragon, Burgundy, and Austria, the later acquisition by his house of the crowns 
of Bohemia, Hungary, Portugal, and, for a short time, even of England, and the 
coincidence of these dynastic events with the Spanish conquest and exploitation 
of the New World – these provided the house of Habsburg with a wealth of 
resources that no other European power could match.
27
 
 
Of course, with such power exerted over all of Europe, the Habsburgs had many enemies. 
 It seems that Charles V had much desired to defend the Catholic faith and bring 
about unity in Christendom.
28
 However, his holdings were too vast and his intervention in 
the affairs at the Diet of Worms too bold for Christendom to support him. Charles sought 
to challenge Luther and the Reformers in Germany but received no praise for doing so. 
After the imperial Diet at Worms, Charles issued the Edict of Worms on May 25, 1521, 
against Martin Luther and those who followed him. This edict condemned Luther as a 
heretic and made him an outlaw. Though Charles V issued this edict in an attempt to 
uphold the unity of Christendom and the doctrine of the Catholic faith, he only increased 
animosity toward himself and the Holy Roman Empire. The followers of Luther 
obviously disagreed with Charles, and the papacy resented his aggressive attempts at 
issuing religious edicts. The stage was set for great conflict. 
Summary 
 Constantine, Augustine, Charlemagne and others could never have imagined the 
course that Christendom would take. However, this survey of the religio-social and 
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political framework it represented, though lengthy, helps to set the stage for further 
understanding the origins of the Thirty Years’ War. Below are the most salient points: 
1. From the time of Constantine, Christianity adopted a new self-understanding as 
persecution ceased and Christian faith became dominant in the Roman Empire. 
This self-understanding was the burgeoning idea of a church-state complex which 
would embody the ideals of God’s kingdom in the Roman Empire. 
2. Augustine, dealing with the reality of Western decline and the sack of Rome, 
began to re-envision the role of empire and the church. He developed a powerful 
theory of “two cities.” However, in practice he still advocated a large role for the 
state in the affairs of faith. Though he did not intend to birth Corpus Christianum, 
as the fount of Western, Roman Catholic theology, his actions spoke loudly and 
inculcated the idea of Christendom into the consciousness of the Catholic faith. 
3. An explicit vision for the state as “heaven on earth” was developed in the East. 
The West did not follow this conception exactly. Nonetheless, the decline of 
imperial structures in the West brought about the rise of the papacy. The pope 
became not only head of the Church but also of a Christianized Roman Empire. 
4. With the coronation of Charlemagne by Leo III, Christendom was solidified. The 
power of “king-making” flowed from the church, as well as the power of 
salvation through the sacramental system. Thus, the entire religio-social and 
political milieu of the West became focused around the Roman Catholic Church. 
5. Certain emperors, particularly the Germanic kings, sought to curb the power of 
the Church. Yet, in the end the Church’s dominant position, as well as the church-
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state complex of Corpus Christianum was only strengthened, as the Lay 
Investiture Controversy made plain. 
6. Eventually, most of Europe came into the hands of the Habsburgs. Under this 
dynastic house, especially Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor of the “Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation,” Corpus Christianum reached its apex. Yet, 
resistance to the Habsburg’s growing power, as well as popular demand for 
reform in the Roman Catholic Church, began to undermine Corpus Christianum. 
Charles V, icon of Habsburg power and the Roman Catholic status quo, would 
unwittingly undermine Christendom in his staunch attempts to defend it.  
 Luther’s impassioned stand at the Diet of Worms, coupled with Charles V’s 
aggressive reaction, would continue to fan the flames of the burgeoning Reformation. 
The Protestant Reformation initiated a thoroughgoing revaluation of Christianity in the 
West. By definition, this would lead to conflict as every aspect of life in the “Holy 
Roman Empire of the German Nation” was thrown into upheaval by the splintering of 
Christendom. 
The Protestant Reformation, Catholic Counter-Reformation, and Intractable 
Problems for the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” 
The Revolutionary Nature of the Protestant Reformation 
 As previously mentioned, the chief human objective in the collective mind of 
Corpus Christianum was salvation from the consequences of sin. This was accomplished 
through grace conferred by the Church in the sacramental system. This understanding of 
salvation was critical in ordering society and politics around the indispensable nature of 
the Roman Catholic Church, the papacy, and the religio-social structures of Christendom. 
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 And, though France was a growing center for Roman Catholic power, in many 
ways the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” was Christendom. Little wonder, 
then, that with the 95 Theses on the Wittenberg door, Martin Luther unleashed a 
firestorm that embroiled the whole of German and European society. Luther almost 
certainly did not intend to let loose chaos in Corpus Christianum, but this was the result 
of his and other Reformer’s actions. 
 Famously standing his ground at the Diet of Worms, Martin Luther argued for the 
religious conscience of the individual and the doctrine of justification by faith alone. In 
the modern Western world, these are hardly radical views. Yet, in Luther’s world, they 
were revolutionary. Gradually, he would begin to question the very foundations of 
Christian society: “Luther’s writings in 1520 only inflamed his terribly strained 
relationship with Rome. ‘To the Christian Nobility’ questioned the church-state nexus 
that had dominated Europe for almost a millennium. ‘The Babylonian Captivity of the 
Church’ undercut the sacramental structure that was fundamental to Rome’s self-
understanding."
29
 Additionally, Luther would return to Augustine the theorist in 
developing his concept of “two governments/kingdoms.” Luther sounds very much the 
theoretical Augustinian when he wrote, “And so God has ordained the two governments, 
the spiritual [government] which fashions true Christians and just persons through the 
Holy Spirit under Christ, and the secular [weltlich] government which holds the 
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Unchristian and wicked in check and forces them to keep the peace outwardly and be 
still, like it or not.”30  
 This return to Augustine’s theoretical “two cities,” in and of itself was a challenge 
to Christendom. Too, Luther’s further remarks were absolutely revolutionary: 
 Each must decide at his own peril what he is to believe, and must see to it that he 
believes rightly. Other people cannot go to heaven or hell on my behalf, or open 
or close [the gates of either] for me. And just as little can they believe or not 
believe on my behalf, or force my faith or unbelief. How he believes is a matter 
for each individual’s conscience, and this does not diminish [the authority of] 
secular governments. They ought therefore to content themselves with attending to 
their own business, and allow people to believe what they can, and what they 
want, and they must use no coercion in this matter against anyone.
31
  
 
In a modern world where church and state are largely separate Luther’s assertion that this 
“does not diminish the authority of secular governments” holds true. However, in the 
religio-social, political framework of Corpus Christianum it most certainly did not.  
 The cohesion of religio-social and political life began to disintegrate. Initially, 
Charles V, distracted by his far-flung empire and the Islamic threat of the Turks, did little 
to work out the problems left by the Diet of Worms. In 1529, issuing a dictate to the Diet 
of Speyer to enforce the conditions of the Edict of Worms, Charles sought to repair 
Christendom. However, many princes and cities began instituting Lutheran practices in 
their local congregations. Several drew up a solemn protest against Charles’ order and 
became known as the “Protesting Estates,” giving the name “Protestant” to all who 
challenged Rome and the structure of Corpus Christianum.
32
 The Protestant Reformation 
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was soon to produce large-scale revolt and conflict in the “Holy Roman Empire of the 
German Nation.” The Peasant’s War (1524-1526), the Schmalkaldic War between 
Charles V and Protestant German Princes (1546-1547), wars of religion throughout the 
16
th
 century, etc. – all were the result of the revolutionary Reformation challenge to 
Christendom. 
The Peace of Augsburg 
 Yet, while the original idea of Corpus Christianum was disintegrating, it had also 
simultaneously reformulated itself. The Protestant princes in Germany, the Calvinist-
Reformed converts in France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, as well as the remaining 
rulers loyal to the House of Habsburg and/or the Roman Catholic Church – all of these 
began to seek to live out Corpus Christianum with their own localized, confessional spin. 
In the Holy Roman Empire, after much conflict, this attempt coalesced in the Peace of 
Augsburg (1555) 
 By its terms, Lutheran princes, imperial knights, and free cities were guaranteed 
security equal to that of the Catholic estates. However, it applied only to those 
Protestants who adhered to the Augsburg Confession, so Calvinists and other 
Protestants were excluded [though mostly tolerated]. It also proclaimed the 
principle that each ruler would determine the religion of his domain and all 
subjects must conform, a principle termed by seventeenth-century jurists Cuius 
regio, eius religio (Latin, literally, “whoever the king, his religion”).33  
 
 While this seemed to provide a way for a reformulated, localized Corpus 
Christianum to continue, this peace was doomed to failure. It had numerous problems 
attendant to it, three of particular importance. First, it dictated that “in the free cities, 
where both Lutheranism and Catholicism existed, the two faiths should share the 
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churches.”34 This was an unmanageable arrangement in light of deep confessional 
differences and the expectation of church-state unity leftover from the long centuries of a 
wholly united Christendom. Second, there was a very controversial section, added in by 
the Emperor, known as the “Ecclesiastical Reservation.” Heinze explains: “In simple 
terms, this meant that if an ecclesiastical ruler became a Lutheran, he could not take his 
property and income with him, but a Catholic successor should be elected in his place.”35 
This clause was violated again and again and became a major source of enmity between 
Lutherans and Catholics. Finally, the Peace of Augsburg completely ignored the 
Reformed/Calvinist churches. In Germany proper, this was not as much of an issue 
because Lutheranism was dominant. Still, in the wider Habsburg holdings of the Holy 
Roman Emperor, this would become a serious problem. 
The Catholic Response 
 In the face of the Protestant threat, the Roman Catholic Church was not idle. 
Initially taken off-guard by the popularity of Luther and other Protestant Reformers, 
eventually a “Counter-Reformation” began. In 1563, the Council of Trent concluded its 
eighteen-year effort at outlining reforms for the Roman Catholic Church. Nearly every 
area of doctrine was reconsidered, but its chief achievement was to reaffirm the Roman 
Catholic vision for Christendom. It clarified Catholic teaching on contested doctrines, put 
in place reforms to correct abuses of clergy, and it placed the parish priest at the center of 
its mission – an important step for later efforts to (re)Catholicize the population.36 
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Additionally, the council rejected the freedom of conscience ensconced in the 
Protestant’s idea of sola Scriptura by reaffirming that Scripture as interpreted by the 
Roman Catholic Church was the measure of orthodox teaching. Also, Luther’s position 
on justification sola fide was largely rejected. The gift of salvation, according to Trent, 
required free-will cooperation and continuation in good works (of which participation in 
Roman Catholic sacramentalism was an important part) to grow in merit of grace.
37
 By 
virtue of its designs for (re)Catholicizing the population as well as its reaffirmation of the 
Roman Catholic sacramental structures of Corpus Christianum, the Council of Trent 
strengthened the eroding position of the Roman Church. It also emboldened the strong 
Catholic sympathies and designs of the Habsburg monarchy. 
 Additionally, this period witnessed the growth of a number of well-organized 
orders and movements for reform. The best known of these is the Jesuits or the Society of 
Jesus. Founded in 1539 by Ignatius Loyola, the Jesuits became a force for missionary 
expansion and education in the Western world. Strengthened by Tridentine reforms and 
the Jesuit order, the Roman Catholic Church engaged in an aggressive program of 
(re)Catholicization. Marc R. Forster, in an important study, summarizes its outcomes:  
 In many parts of Catholic Germany … the Counter-Reformation began with an 
effort to convert Protestant populations to Catholicism. ... Catholic princes 
followed similar policies in the decades before the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ 
War, exacerbating political and religious tensions. These policies were an integral 
aspect of Tridentine reform as well as part of the attempt to strengthen state 
power.
38
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So it was that the reforms of Trent and the unleashing of aggressive Catholic orders 
began to further exacerbate tensions and work to undo the tenuous Peace of Augsburg. 
Additional Religious Pressures 
 In addition to the fundamentally religious tensions present in the “Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation,” there were important developments in France and Spain. 
These circumstances would greatly add to the pressure being placed on the older order of 
Corpus Christianum and would play a role in moving the whole of Europe toward the all-
encompassing conflict known as the Thirty Years’ War. A brief survey of the additional 
religious and political pressures brought about in France and Spain is necessary before 
moving toward a summary of the problems facing the German lands. 
 In Catholic (though non-Habsburg) France, attempts at rapprochement had been 
made between Catholic and Huguenot (French Calvinist-Protestants) elements but had 
largely failed. One last, important attempt was made to bring about Catholic-Protestant 
peace in France. An arranged marriage between the Catholic, Margaret of Valois (sister 
to King Charles IX), and the Protestant, Henry of Navarre (Bourbon heir), was supposed 
to mend fences and provide a stabilizing treaty-by-marriage between Catholic and 
Protestant factions. Many Huguenot nobles came to attend the ceremony in Paris on 
August 18, 1572. Nevertheless, through a series of intrigues, an influential Huguenot 
leader was assassinated on August 22. Catherine de’ Medici, Charles IX’s mother and 
influential power-broker behind his rule, in fear of Huguenot retaliation ordered the rest 
of the Huguenot leadership to be killed. This boiled over into the St. Bartholomew’s Day 
Massacre on August 23, 1572, which spilled over into an intense persecution of 
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Huguenots in France. Many of them fled during this period to the “Holy Roman Empire 
of the German Nation,” especially to the regions of the Palatinate and Bohemia. 
 Once the French Calvinists were present in large numbers in German lands, a 
phenomenal conversion from Lutheranism to Calvinistic-Reformed Christianity would 
begin. This large-scale Protestant shift would come to be known as the “Second 
Reformation.” It would have important ramifications for Germany and the Thirty Years’ 
War. Later, Emperor Ferdinand the II, would directly blame “the subversive Calvinist 
schools” for the revolt of Bohemia which launched the conflict.39 
 In Catholic, Habsburg Spain, events were unfolding which also contributed to the 
situation leading up to the Thirty Years’ War. Upon Charles V’s abdication of the 
Habsburg throne in 1555/56 “The Habsburg dynasty had split into Austrian and Spanish 
lines ... Charles had left his son, Philip II, the Spanish Habsburg territories, which 
included the Netherlands, Italy, and the Spanish colonies in the New World. He had left 
to his brother, Ferdinand I, the Austrian Habsburg territories [i.e., “The Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation], including Hungary and Bohemia.”40 Philip II proved to 
be a staunch and aggressive militarist for the papacy, Roman Catholicisim generally, and 
Habsburg interests. A supporter of the Spanish Inquisition’s efforts to control Protestants 
and a staunch warrior against the Calvinist rebellions in the Spanish Netherlands, Philip 
II was responsible for decades of war against Protestant challengers to the Habsburg-
Catholic domination of Corpus Christianum. 
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 Eventually, Philip the II’s protracted war against the United Provinces (Dutch-
Reformed, northern territories in the formerly Spanish Netherlands) and remaining 
Protestant elements in the south would be handed to his son Philip III. A “Twelve Years’ 
Truce” from 1609-1621 would bring about an end to the conflict. However, the continued 
pressure placed on the southern Spanish Netherlands by the Calvinist north would 
exacerbate tensions between Spanish, Dutch, and French interests – eventually dragging 
all three parties into the Thirty Years’ War. 
 A final, important development involving Spain is seen in what is known as the 
Oñate Agreement between Philip III and Ferdinand II. In this treaty in 1617, “the Spanish 
ambassador, Oñate, secured a secret agreement with Ferdinand [presumptive successor to 
his uncle, Holy Roman Emperor Matthias] by which he promised, if he became king of 
Bohemia and emperor, to cede to Spain Piombino and Finale in Italy, and Alsace. By 
means of [this] Habsburg family compact … Ferdinand was recognized as their candidate 
for Bohemia and the Empire.”41 This important agreement had at least two results. First, 
and most pressing, it practically guaranteed war would break out in the German lands. 
Ferdinand was widely viewed as a danger to Protestants and an aggressive proponent for 
the reunification of Corpus Christianum under the Catholic Habsburgs. Nicola Sutherland 
poignantly remarks, “as a Jesuit-trained absolutist, Ferdinand was the last prince in 
Christendom who could be expected to preside over an acceptable adjudication of the 
Peace of Augsburg. This alarming prospect therefore caused Frederick [an imperial 
elector] of the Palatinate, and others concerned, to set about stiffening the Protestant 
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Union.”42 Second, it effectively placed the anti-Habsburg France into a pincer between 
the Habsburg rulers – a reality which would exacerbate tensions and draw France into a 
political strategy for the second half of the Thirty Years’ War (1635-1648). 
Intractable Problems in the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” 
 To summarize, there were several critical problems coalescing in the German 
lands of the Holy Roman Empire which ultimately undermined the fragile Peace of 
Augsburg and set the stage for the Thirty Years War. The most important of these are 
summarized below: 
1. Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformers – simply by virtue of questioning the 
centrality of the sacramental system and the supremacy of the Roman Catholic 
Church – would destabilize Corpus Christianum, thus creating conditions for 
large-scale conflict and societal upheaval. It is probable this was not Luther’s 
original intention. However, just by virtue of challenging the Church and the Holy 
Roman Emperor, this was the outcome. This was certainly a religious issue. 
2. The destabilization mentioned above led many Protestants to develop a “theology 
of resistance” not before seen in Christendom. Luther’s radical attempt to 
recapture the Augustinian theology of “two kingdoms” and Calvin’s decidedly 
different attempts in Geneva to do the same were a challenge to the very structure 
of religio-social, political reality. Additionally, tracts such as Vindiciae Contra 
Tyrannos and Theodore Beza’s The Right of Magistrates over Their Subjects, 
were strong Protestant attempts to detail the limitations of state power and to 
provide a justification for rebellion against the powers in the name of religious 
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principle. The above were religious issues which unleashed particular political 
consequences.  This was especially true in the initial Bohemian uprising which 
started the Thirty Years’ War – a rebellion driven by the “revolutionary” 
Huguenot refugees and other Reformed-Calvinist Christians in Prague.  
3. In an age of confessionalization, strictly theological issues repeatedly became 
political ones. An example of this was the strong divisions between Roman 
Catholics, Lutherans and Reformed Christians regarding the Lord’s Supper. As 
Heinze comments on a French effort to bring peace between Reformed Huguenots 
and Roman Catholics, “Ironically, the meal in which Christians remember their 
Lord’s sacrifice for them and express their unity in Christ was the rock on which 
efforts to restore unity foundered.”43  
4. When the above factors (Protestant challenge to unified Christendom, theological 
justification for resisting authority, and confessional tensions) coalesced to 
produce armed conflict between Protestants and Catholics, Corpus Christianum 
suffered irreparable damage. In Germany, especially, the Peace of Augsburg was 
doomed because it failed to deal with confessional differences, it failed to include 
all groups (i.e., Reformed Christians) in the terms, it preserved inflammatory 
provisions such as the “Ecclesiastical Reservation,” and it did nothing to put 
limits on Jesuit and Tridentine (re)Catholicization in the region. Thus, efforts at 
peace prior to the Thirty Years’ War simply miscarried due to inattention to the 
underlying religious issues. 
5. Imperial abuses, arising from confessional politics, were also on the rise. One 
such case which exacerbated tensions in the run-up to the Thirty Years’ War was 
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the intervention of then Emperor Rudolf II into the church politics at Donauwӧrth. 
Due to Protestant resistance to a Roman Catholic procession in April 1606 on St. 
Mark’s Day, Rudolf II sent in troops and restored the Donauwӧrth parish to 
Catholic control. This incident led to the formation of the Protestant Union (1608) 
and the Catholic League (1609) - informal agreements between religiously 
aligned princes, cities, etc. for military defense. In response to escalating tensions 
and pressure from the Protestant Union, Rudolf signed the infamous Letter of 
Majesty on 9 July 1609. This granted the Bohemian Protestants far wider 
freedoms than the Augsburg Peace of 1555. Essentially, every lord and free city 
was allowed to choose which confession to follow. This undermined the Peace of 
Augsburg, and as Peter Wilson remarks, “effectively created a parallel 
government [in Bohemia].”44 Again, this was first a religious issue and only 
secondarily a political one. 
6. In the wake of the Tridentine reforms, an aggressive (re)Catholicization was being 
played out in the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.” The papacy was 
driving this, and the Emperors leading up to the Thirty Years’ War (Rudolf II and 
Matthias) were complacent. This was an issue of religious conviction with very 
negative political implications as Imperial allowance or force (i.e., Donauwӧrth 
incident) was being used to undo the advances of Protestantism. 
7. Finally, the election of Ferdinand II, duke of Styria, as the new Holy Roman 
Emperor – a result guaranteed by the Oñate Agreement – was a clear indication to 
the Protestants in the empire that forced (re)Catholicization was coming. Twenty 
years earlier, Ferdinand II had “taken his coronation oath [in Styria] to observe 
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the liberties of his subjects; but these liberties, he said, had nothing to do with 
religion. He had simply banished the Protestant leaders of the Styrian estates and 
had replaced them with his own officials.”45 Like all of the other problems present 
in the German lands, the election of Ferdinand II was a religious issue at its core.  
 As this survey moves forward now to an examination of the Thirty Years’ War 
proper, the background is in place to interact with the claims of scholars regarding the 
origins of the conflict. However, what should be abundantly clear at this juncture is that 
every issue which modern scholarship might want to place in a merely “secular” sphere 
is, at its core, a religious issue when it is placed in the overarching religio-social, political 
context of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Corpus Christianum was a holistic 
conception of Christian life on earth. The pressures of the Reformation along with the 
issues it would continue to bring to the fore in “The Holy Roman Empire of the German 
Nation” argue strongly that the origins of the Thirty Years’ War should be seen as 
essentially religious. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
45
 H.G. Koenigsberger, The Habsburgs and Europe, 223.  
31 
 
PART 2 
A REVOLT TURNS INTO THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 
 At this point it is necessary to paint a representative picture of the various 
scholarly interpretations regarding the nature of the Thirty Years’ War. This thesis has 
already argued that its origins and early outworking should be seen as essentially 
religious because they were grounded in a complex of issues all related to the 
reformulation of Christendom due to the Protestant Reformation. This position will be 
put in relief as various scholarly points are examined and a general critique is presented.  
 After the brief survey of scholarly opinion is interacted with, we will next survey 
the conflict proper. This section offers the general contours of the Thirty Years’ War. The 
conflict involved nearly every major and minor power in Europe and was lengthy and 
complex. However, an attempt at understanding the overall flow of the conflict is 
important for two reasons. First, it will help to establish the strongly religious nature of 
the war in its first half, from 1618 to the death of the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus 
in 1632. Second, it will also provide a transition point. For, as the second half of the 
Thirty Years’ War moves forward from 1633-1648 it will become increasingly clear that 
the war would ultimately lead to the dissipation of the religio-social, political vision of 
Corpus Christianum.  
Summary and Critique of Scholarly Views on the Origins of the Thirty Years’ War 
The Proliferation of Writings about the Thirty Years’ War 
 The Thirty Years’ War has long captured the interest of historians and writers. As 
soon as its hostilities were concluded in the Peace of Westphalia, contemporaries were 
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already calling it “The Thirty Years’ War.”46 Also, within a relatively short amount of 
time, it was receiving attention as an object for study and novelization. A few of these 
attempts were particularly noteworthy.  The first was the 1667 study The Conditions of 
the German Empire by Samuel Pufendorf, a law professor who served in both Sweden 
and Brandenburg as an official historiographer.
47
 Additionally, a very famous 1668 
autobiographical novel by Hans Grimmelshausen entitled The Adventures of Simplicius 
Simplicissimus (German: Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch) is considered 
valuable source material.
48
 In this work, Grimmelshausen details the ordinary experience 
of peasants during the war as well as the grotesque atrocities and brutal violence 
committed by soldiers and peasants alike in the desperate days of the extended conflict. 
Another important contemporary source was Hans Heberle’s diary accounts, Zeytregister 
(1618-1672).
49
 
 Yet, while the above-mentioned source texts are important, they are literally but a 
few of thousands of works published on the Thirty Years’ War. The conflict included 
participants from Germany, Bohemia (Czech Republic), Hungary, Austria, Denmark, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Italy, and others. The dizzying number of 
languages and perspectives is literally mind-boggling. Thus, while it is impossible to give 
a complete survey of the scholarship on the Thirty Years’ War, it is imaginable to provide 
a highly selective, yet representative summary of important scholarly views. In the 
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paragraphs that follow, some notable sources will be mentioned and their arguments 
summarized. 
Important Scholarly Trends Regarding the Thirty Years’ War 
 An important scholarly history of the Thirty Years’ War was completed by the 
playwright, poet, philosopher, and historian Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller. His 
survey, History of the Thirty Years’ War in Germany, was published in 1791. He would 
also publish an epic poem based around the Catholic General Albrecht von Wallenstein 
in the late 1790’s which is considered “the equivalent of Shakespeare’s history play for 
the German-speaking world.”50 Schiller’s history is instructive for it included elements of 
the Gothic preoccupation with death along with an emphasis on the tragic inevitability of 
the conflict.
51
 Yet, it is also notable as an archetype of the religious interpretation that 
dominated until the latter part of the twentieth century. Schiller opened his account with a 
strong statement that shaped the whole of his narrative:  
 From the beginning of the religious wars in Germany, to the peace of Münster 
[one of the treaties in the larger Peace of Westphalia], scarcely any thing great or 
remarkable occurred in the political world of Europe in which the Reformation 
had not an important share. All the events of this period, if they did not originate 
in, soon became mixed up with, the question of religion, and no state was either 
too great or too little to feel directly or indirectly more or less its influence.
52
 
 With slight variations in emphasis, the religious interpretation of the Thirty Years’ 
War held sway from roughly the end of the conflict until the latter part of the twentieth 
century. For example, the Cambridge History of Christianity sums up the view that both 
the cause and the settlement of the conflict was, at its core, religious: “The Thirty Years’ 
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War (1618-1648), being in part a war of religion, made it clear that a better and more 
comprehensive settlement than the Peace of Augsburg was needed. The Peace of 
Westphalia (1648) which ended the war was … a fundamentally religious settlement.”53 
Again, while some variation was present, this view continued. 
 Another important study, which left the religious view intact but also began 
widening the examination of its causes, is C.V. Wedgwood’s 1938 treatment of the 
conflict, The Thirty Years War. In this work she clearly proclaimed the centrality of 
religion in the conflict. For instance, in commenting on the fact that its origins were in 
religion and its effects devastated religious belief, she wrote: “After the expenditure of so 
much human life to so little purpose, men might have grasped the essential futility of 
pitting the beliefs of the mind to the judgment of the sword. Instead, they rejected 
religion as an object to fight for and found others.”54 However, Wedgwood also began to 
widen the scope of examination. In examining the religious causes she paid special 
attention to the militant and political nature of Calvinism and the role it played in the 
conflict.
55
 Additionally, while emphasizing the German situation, she also began to 
emphasize the power struggles between France, England, Spain, and Germany. 
 Consciously or not, scholarship in the latter part of the twentieth century has 
tended to move further down the road Wedgwood began to travel and embrace non-
religious causation for the conflict. An instance of this trend is the very important 
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scholarship put forward by a team of academics under the guidance of Geoffrey Parker in 
The Thirty Years’ War, now in its second, updated edition. Parker and the other writers 
examined the conflict from nearly every possible angle and emphasized several factors: 
the Habsburg monarchy and its problems, the paralysis of the Imperial institutions, and 
the growing economic issues highlighted by monarchical debt.
56
 Parker’s treatment does 
not overlook religion. Nevertheless, it tended to view even the religious causes of the war 
as relating to difficulties with the succession and election of new Habsburg monarchs.
57
 
 Continuing the trend away from viewing the war as centrally religious was 
Richard Bonney: “The Thirty Years’ War began as a religious war … [but] developed 
into a political contest that saw the Austrian Habsburg rulers of the Holy Roman Empire 
seeking to expand their control in Europe, while a number of other powers (such as 
Sweden) tried to limit their ambitions.”58 This line of thinking has been taken even 
further by Hans Medick and Benjamin Marschke. While not dismissing religious factors 
entirely, they have commented, “The Thirty Years’ War has often been referred to as the 
last of the religious wars. This characterization is problematic for several reasons. On 
both sides of the religious divide, rulers made decisions based on secular dynastic 
interests, international relations, and constitutional politics.”59 As the move away from 
viewing the war as essentially religious has gained traction, the issues of Habsburg rule 
and the Imperial constitution have begun to be emphasized. Stephen J. Lee, for example, 
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represents the view of many that the Thirty Years’ War was, at its core, a 
constitutional/electoral crisis which was exacerbated along confessional lines.
60
  
 A survey of the scholarship regarding the war would not be complete, though, 
without referencing the prolific writings and strong viewpoint of Peter H. Wilson. The 
G.F. Grant Professor of History at the University of Hull is the chief proponent of the 
drive toward viewing the Thirty Years’ War as a constitutional conflict of the “Holy 
Roman Empire of the German Nation.” In his nearly 1000-page study of the war, Wilson 
has asserted two points of particular importance. First, he stated that though the event was 
extremely complex, its various parts should be connected “through their common 
relationship to the imperial constitution.”61 Second, while not dismissing religion entirely 
he has rejected religious causes as being central.
62
  
Critique and Reassertion of the Link to Corpus Christianum 
 It would be unfair and disingenuous to pretend that there were not significant 
imperial problems which played a part in fomenting the Thirty Years’ War. In fact, in a 
conflict that was often confusing, even to contemporaries living through it, it would be 
the height of modern hubris to declare that an absolutely definitive interpretation of the 
origins of the war is possible.
63
 Nonetheless, as this thesis has argued, the newer 
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interpretations which have tended to sideline religious causes, while pointing out valuable 
issues, have also overstated the case. Below is a brief critique of the overall trend toward 
minimizing religious causes, along with specific points that argue against this tendency. 
 N. M. Sutherland has written, “No historian of the Thirty Years’ War has paid 
systematic attention to its origins. Most have contented themselves with taking the 
imperial civil war as the real starting-point.”64 It is the opinion of this author that she is 
largely correct. Thus, this work has given systematic attention to the origins and 
outworking of Corpus Christianum up to the eruption of hostilities in 1618. Failure to 
recognize the overarching religio-social, political framework of Christendom has led to a 
devaluing of the religious causes, a position that is unwarranted. The war’s origins lie in 
the revision and fracturing of Christendom precipitated by the radical events of the 
Protestant Reformation. The Thirty Years’ War represented the final attempt to 
reformulate and appropriate the model of Corpus Christianum.
65
  
 Additionally, while there were significant political challenges within the electoral 
system for Habsburg succession (economic and military disparity between princes, issues 
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of language and culture in the respective territories of the electoral kingdoms, etc.), these 
were largely nullified by the Oñate Agreement of 1617. This compact clarified the role of 
the Spanish and German branches of the House of Habsburg and streamlined the 
succession of Ferdinand II to the throne. However, the religious question surrounding the 
leadership of Corpus Christianum was still unresolved. This question became especially 
significant as the Calvinistic-Reformed vision for Christendom became ascendant in the 
important electoral region of the Palatinate, as well as in Bohemia, prior to the war. The 
Bohemian Rebellion of 1618 was the flashpoint for the outbreak of wider hostilities. 
 Even on a popular level, the issues generated by the Reformation were decidedly 
religious. As Wedgwood remarked, “The generation which preceded the Thirty Years’ 
War may not have been more virtuous than its predecessors, but it was certainly more 
devout.”66 Her statement holds no little importance in grasping the religious situation of 
the populace. It is argued by some scholars that the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation actually evangelized the general population, which, while participating in 
the Roman Catholic Church’s sacramental system, did not necessarily have strong 
confessional tendencies. For example, Kaspar von Greyerz includes a quote by the 
French historian Jean Delameau on this point: “[O]n the eve of the Reformation, the 
average European was only superficially Christianized. Under these conditions, the two 
reforms, that of Luther and that of Rome, were in the end merely two ostensibly 
competing, though in the final analyses converging, processes of Christianizing the 
masses and spiritualizing religious sensibilities.”67 An additional example of this idea is 
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seen in Marc R. Forster’s assertion that the Tridentine attempts at (re)Catholicization 
which had grown in intensity prior to the Thirty Years’ War were actually efforts to 
convert generational Protestants to the Roman Catholic faith. Whatever the case, the 
issues brought out by the Protestant Reformation were unresolved, and at both the 
aristocratic and popular level, religion became central.  In this climate, Christians were 
anxious to assert either a Protestant or Roman Catholic identity for the reunification of 
Corpus Christianum. 
 Finally, the pressure being applied by the Habsburg monarchy and its staunchly 
Roman Catholic vision for Christendom had heightened the tensions in the Holy Roman 
Empire. This was especially true for the Emperor Ferdinand II: “His Catholic convictions 
amounted … to ‘a consuming passion.’ Convinced that he had a divine mission to 
reconvert the Habsburg dominions to Catholicism, he had already imposed ‘confessional 
absolutism’ on his own province of Styria.”68 It was his intent to do the same in Bohemia, 
something the strongly Calvinistic Christians there could not abide. Again, this was a 
religious issue. The partitions and challenges left over from a once-united, now-divided 
Christendom were “turning up the heat” in the German lands. The Peace of Augsburg 
could not and would not hold.  
 As this study moves forward into an overview of the struggle itself, the essentially 
religious nature of the conflict’s origins will be seen even more clearly. This was 
particularly the case in the first half of the Thirty Years’ War from the Bohemian Revolt 
to the death of the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus (1618-1632). As the survey of the 
proceeds into the second half (1634-1648) it will be seen, though, that the war eventually 
undermined religion and became a pan-European war waged over increasingly 
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secularized, nationalistic motivations. From there, a move toward dissecting the effects of 
the Thirty Years’ War will be effectively launched. We now turn to an examination of the 
war in an effort to emphasize its major battles and developments. 
The Thirty Years’ War, Part One: 1618-1632 
The Bohemian Revolt and Aftermath (1618-1623) 
 Although tensions were running high after the Donauwӧrth Incident in 1607 and 
the formations of the Protestant Union and Catholic League, they were soon eased. 
Rudolph’s Letter of Majesty, followed by his successor, Matthias’s, relatively benign rule 
led many to believe that a period of religious toleration in accord with the Augsburg 
Peace would recommence. This was not to be the case. With Matthias’ appointment of 
his Jesuit-trained, ardently Catholic nephew, Ferdinand II, as his successor it was merely 
a matter of time before conflict would arise. This became a foregone conclusion as 
Ferdinand was crowned King of Bohemia in June of 1617. As King of Styria, Ferdinand 
II had enacted aggressive (re)Catholicization efforts. There was every reason to believe 
that he would do the same in Bohemia. As Helfferich comments: “It was an open secret 
that Ferdinand agreed to uphold the Bohemian Letter of Majesty only in order to gain the 
Bohemian crown, and once named as king-designate, he immediately began a systematic 
attempt to suppress both Protestantism and the local estates in his territories.”69 These 
attempts included censorship, the deposing of Protestant officials, and a reversal of 
religious policies determined under previous agreements. 
 This situation was untenable, and on May 23, 1618 the so-called Defenestration of 
Prague launched the Thirty Years’ War. In this incident, two representatives of King 
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Ferdinand, along with one of their secretaries, were thrown out of a 70-foot-high window 
in Prague Castle. Miraculously they survived. However, the fragile peace in the German 
lands did not. Events moved quickly as the rebels declared Ferdinand II to be deposed as 
their king. In his stead, they placed the Bohemian crown on Frederick V, Elector of the 
Palatinate. Frederick, a devout Calvinist-Protestant and powerful prince of the Palatinate, 
was only 23 years old. Despite his passionate Calvinism and the fact that he was “one of 
the best-connected princes in Protestant Europe,”70 Frederick turned out to be a very 
weak leader. He was not only unable to effectively organize the military but he also 
struggled to make alliances and gain support. He was prodded on by some of his 
staunchest allies, particularly Prince Christian of Anhalt-Bernberg. In the end, though, 
even potential allies such as his father-in-law, King James I of England, were not willing 
to enter into the conflict on his behalf. 
 The situation for Frederick and the Bohemian rebels quickly deteriorated. In 
1619, Ferdinand II officially took hold of the title of Holy Roman Emperor from his 
uncle, Matthias. This was critical, for although the Bohemian rebels had deposed him as 
their king, the title and rights of Emperor allowed him to assert legal claims to the throne 
and to undermine the statesmanship of Frederick. Additionally, the Spanish Habsburg 
forces invaded Frederick’s territories in the Lower Palatinate and undermined his ability 
to utilize his title and strength in his native electoral region. By the first major battle of 
the war, at White Mountain (5 miles outside of Prague) on November 8, 1620, the 
situation for the Bohemians was bleak. Though the military numbers were roughly 
equivalent, Ferdinand’s forces were guided by the experienced Catholic League 
commanders, Maximilian of Bavaria and Johannes Tserklaes, Count of Tilly. By contrast, 
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Frederick’s forces were not seasoned and his Upper Palatinate minister, Prince Christian 
of Anhalt-Bernburg, was not of the quality of Tilly or Maximilian. Within hours, the 
rebel forces were crushed and Prague was opened to the onslaught of the Imperial-
Bavarian army. Maximilian offered immunity to those who fled.  However, rebel leaders 
who stayed were hunted down and killed. Frederick V was forced to flee back to his 
Palatinate lands and abdicated the Bohemian throne.
71
   
 Using the Palatinate as his base of operations, Frederick sought over the next 
three years to regain his foothold and make gains. Unfortunately for him, his forces 
absorbed one defeat after another. By August of 1623 he had lost everything and was 
forced to flee to the United Provinces (the Netherlands). In February of 1624, 
Ferdinand II officially deposed Frederick as Elector of the Palatinate.  
 The decisive defeat of the Calvinist-Protestant rebels, along with the 
unwillingness of the remaining Lutheran princes of the Protestant Union to support the 
failed leadership of Frederick should have ended the conflict. However, for three reasons 
it continued and exploded into a wider war after 1624. First, pockets of resistance in the 
Upper and Rhine Palatinate refused to give up and held out for years. Second, the 
Spanish Habsburg forces moved into the Rhine Palatinate to prepare for further war with 
their former (United Provinces) and current (Spanish Netherlands) Dutch lands. A 
twelve-year truce from 1609-1621 had kept the peace. Now, Spanish intervention 
exacerbated Protestant and Catholic tensions. Third, and finally, The Lutheran king of 
Denmark, Christian IV, who owned many lands in northern Germany, became convinced 
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that he must intervene for the Protestant cause and for his territory. This would set up the 
next phase of the war (1625-1629). 
 Again, it is important to note that this first phase of the Thirty Years’ War was 
decidedly religious. Territorial gains and political strategy certainly played a part. 
Nonetheless, the aggressive (re)Catholicization of Ferdinand II coupled with the 
diametrically opposed Calvinist-Protestant vision for Corpus Christianum found in 
Bohemia and the Palatinate was the major factor in the war. A further corroboration of 
the centrality of religious causation was found in the popular view of the time. This 
assessment was that the conflict represented God’s judgment on the sinfulness of 
Christendom. The famous diary of the shoemaker Hans Heberle, Zeytregister, ensconced 
this perspective. In a 1630 re-write of his diary’s 1618 introduction, he commented on the 
religious import of the war and an associated astral event:  
Anno 1618, a great comet appeared in the form of a great and terrible rod through 
and by which God threatened us mightily because of our sinful lives, which we 
fully deserved and continue to deserve daily. … What it meant and what would 
follow thereafter [the war] causes one to cry hot tears … Anno 1619, Ferdinand II 
became the [Holy] Roman Emperor, under whom a great persecution happened 
through war, unrest, and the spilling of the blood of Christians … First he started 
a big war in Bohemia, which he then oppressed under his religion.
72
 
 From the Emperor to the “man on the street,” the beginning of the Thirty Years’ 
War was widely viewed as being religiously centered. When this popular view of the 
conflict’s contemporaries is examined and set in the context of Corpus Christianum, it 
becomes clear that the religious origins of the war should not be dismissed in the more 
secularized climate of contemporary scholarship. 
The Danish Phase (1624-1629) 
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 Significant effort was spent to frame the beginning phase of the war as essentially 
religious. As this examination moves forward, it will be argued that this continued to be 
the case in the Danish phase, despite two surprising twists; one made by the Lutheran 
king of Denmark, Christian IV, and the other by Ferdinand II. Both of these players, in an 
effort to curtail the conflict, would focus their attention around the agreement which had 
allowed Christendom in the Holy Roman Empire to limp along, the Peace of Augsburg 
(1555).  However, their application of the Augsburg agreement differed greatly, with 
Ferdinand’s action almost guaranteeing that religious conflict would continue. 
 With his resounding defeat at the hands of the Imperial-Bavarian army, 
Frederick V was deposed and exiled. However, his remaining allies in the Palatinate, as 
well as his father-in-law in England, sought to put pressure on King Christian IV of 
Denmark to rise to the defense of the Protestant cause. Initially, the Dane was somewhat 
reluctant to do so. Nonetheless, he was also alarmed at the aggressive (re)Catholicization 
being implemented by Ferdinand II. After some deliberation, Christian declared his 
intention to come to the aid of the Protestants in a letter (February 21, 1626) to the 
archbishops and electors of the northern German lands. However, in a surprising twist, he 
also sought to make clear that his desire was not to outlaw Roman Catholicism but, 
instead, to return the large part of Christendom represented by the “Holy Roman Empire 
of the German Nation,” to the compromise position of the Peace of Augsburg: 
[W]e were inclined toward peace … and wished to be excused before God and the 
world for all of the judgments and bloodletting that would ensue. … [However] in 
order to save this circle [i.e., defensive alliance in northern electorates] … and to 
save German liberty, which is everywhere suffering, we joined with them in a 
confederation so that thereby, with the grace of God the Almighty, liberty and the 
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Religious and Secular Peace [of 1555] might not be lost, but conserved through 
those means allowed by God and nature.
73
  
 Despite his somewhat lengthy deliberations about becoming involved in the fight, 
King Christian was initially very confident he would succeed. However, Emperor 
Ferdinand II had not been idle in the wake of his initial victories during the Bohemian 
rebellion and the Palatinate phase of the war. Desiring an army that would be under direct 
Imperial control without any constraints from the Catholic League, Ferdinand had 
negotiated with his general Albrecht von Wallenstein and had authorized him to raise an 
army of some 25,000 troops. Wallenstein was an adept recruiter and negotiator as well as 
an impressive military commander. The force he raised would prove to be decisive in the 
Danish phase of the war. Though Wallenstein suffered some minor setbacks, his army 
crushed the Danish forces on September 2, 1628 in the Battle of Wolgast. Christian IV 
was forced to take refuge by ship and return to Denmark. By 1629, he had negotiated 
with Ferdinand for peace and withdrawn entirely from the war. 
 While this turn of events could have, once again, ended the conflict, Ferdinand II 
would make a move that guaranteed further bloodshed. Ferdinand – under the advice of 
his hawkish, Jesuit confessor Lamormaini – would issue the fateful Edict of Restitution. 
In this decree, Ferdinand also appealed to the Peace of Augsburg, albeit in a very 
different way than Christian IV. First, his dictate sought to reverse the gains made by 
Lutherans in claiming church property through their former refusal to abide by the 
controversial “Ecclesiastical Reservation” in the Augsburg peace. Also, Ferdinand’s 
order outlawed Calvinism and any sect that was not Roman Catholic or adhered to the 
Augsburg Confession (i.e., Lutheran). Two brief excerpts from the Edict of Restitution 
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help to illustrate the untenable religio-political situation that was introduced through this 
decree. First, the attack on Lutherans through the retroactive enforcement of the 
Ecclesiastical Reservation: 
Thus we are finally resolved, for the genuine implementation of the Secular and 
Religious Peace, to delegate forthwith our imperial commissioners to go into the 
empire; to reclaim from their illegal holders those archbishoprics and bishoprics, 
prelatures, cloisters, and other ecclesiastical property, hospitals, and foundations 
that the Catholics possessed at the time of the Treaty of Passau [1552].
74
 
Next, the devastating blow to the Calvinist-Reformed Protestants, especially those who 
had sided with Frederick V: 
We also hereby … declare and recognize that the Religious Peace concerns and 
includes only those of the ancient Catholic religion and the adherents of the 
unaltered Augsburg Confession, as it was presented to our beloved ancestor 
Emperor Charles V in the year 1530 on the 25
th
 of June. All other contrary 
doctrines and sects, of whatever name and whether they have already arisen or are 
still to arise, shall be impermissible, excluded from the peace, forbidden, and 
neither tolerated nor suffered.
75
 
With the above diktat, Ferdinand had once again shown that he had no intention of 
allowing for Protestantism to have an equal footing in the life of Corpus Christianum. 
This decree would raise the ire of many in the Holy Roman Empire and precipitated the 
next phase of the war, the intervention by Sweden under the command of the “Lion of the 
North,” Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden. 
 As with the earlier Bohemian and Palatinate phases of the war, the Danish 
intervention can be seen as a decidedly religious endeavor. Perhaps more than any 
personality in the war, Christian IV seemed to have had pure motives. He did seek to 
“save” the Protestant cause, although not to the exclusion of Catholic worship and 
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freedom. The Danish king, in fact, seemed content to live within the tension of a 
reformulated Christendom under the terms of the Peace of Augsburg. Christian IV was 
moved toward the conflict, inexorably, by the designs of the Protestants in England and 
the Calvinists supporting Frederick V. There were religious causes at root in this stage of 
the war even if political opportunism was also at play. Again, the controlling issue at this 
point of the war was still to decide the shape of the religio-social, political reality of 
Corpus Christianum. 
 For the Roman Catholic Habsburgs, the motives at this stage were also decidedly 
religious – especially for Ferdinand II and his Jesuit advisors. The Edict of Restitution 
was a decidedly pro-Catholic, religiously motivated, power grab. It fit the pattern of 
Ferdinand’s rule – a pattern exhibited since his first moves as King of Styria. Ferdinand, 
like the other Habsburg princes and monarchs, was self-consciously Catholic and 
determined to restore the proper order of Corpus Christianum to its rightful Roman 
Catholic foundation. Ironically, however, Ferdinand’s decree set the stage for drawing in 
Swedish military might under King Gustavus Adolphus. This led to renewal of the 
Protestant cause as well as the unseating of the important imperial general, Albrecht von 
Wallenstein. 
Swedish Intervention (1630-1635) 
 With the official entrance of Sweden into the fighting, the Thirty Years’ War 
began to take on a decidedly international character. At this point in the conflict, one can 
see the ever-widening scope of the war. Standing on one side and representing most of 
the Roman Catholic powers in Europe were the pro-Habsburg powers of Spain and the 
Holy Roman Empire, along with Italian and papal elements. On the other side were those 
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aligned with the pro-Protestant elements in Germany and Bohemia along with the Swedes 
who enjoyed Franco-Dutch support (indirectly through financial payments, and directly 
through military alliances against Spanish and Italian interests).  
 Despite this, it is the opinion of this author that the conflict at this point still 
remained a battle for the shape of a united Corpus Christianum. This can be seen 
especially in the larger-than-life figure, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. It is true 
that Geoffrey Parker, in citing Adolphus’ war declaration from June 1630 does state the 
following: “There was no mention at all of what Sweden hoped to gain by her 
intervention, nor of any desire to save the Protestant cause from extinction at the hands of 
Imperial troops.”76 Additionally, the important statesman, Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna 
of Sweden, steadfastly maintained that there was no distinct religious purpose behind 
Sweden’s involvement. However, a wider look at Protestant sentiment during this stage 
of the war, as well as a look at the character and aims of Gustavus, will show, once again, 
that the war continued to be decidedly religious in character.  
 Swedish involvement in the war was begun and expanded by a combination of 
factors. First, King Gustavus was clearly in the crosshairs of Imperial expansionism. As 
the Danish threat from Christian IV quickly came to naught, Albrecht von Wallenstein – 
with pressure from the Emperor, Spain, and France – had begun to march north toward 
the Baltic Sea. The army of Wallenstein occupied large areas of Pomerania, making the 
invasion of Sweden for Imperial gain a distinct possibility. It became quite clear that this 
was the plan when Wallenstein put Straslund (northern Pomeranian city ideal for 
launching a naval invasion of Sweden) under siege. Straslund held, but the 
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counteroffensive launched from there by Christian IV would lead to his destruction at the 
aforementioned Battle of Wolgast. 
 This would lead to the second factor bringing Sweden into the war, the direct 
intervention of Wallenstein and Ferdinand II in the Swedish conflict against Poland. 
Geoffrey Parker sums up the situation well: “[Christian IV’s defeat] left Wallenstein free 
to loan 12,000 of his troops to the emperor’s brother-in-law, Sigismund of Poland, who 
had been fighting off a Swedish invasion since 1625.”77 This intervention nearly led to 
the death of Gustavus and the destruction of his army at the Battle of Honigfelde on June 
27, 1629.  
 The third factor followed Gustavus’ near demise. He escaped and retired from 
Poland just in time to receive a French envoy sent by the crafty Cardinal Richelieu. 
Richelieu and France, seeking to undermine Habsburg power (to be seen in more detail 
later), had sought, to no avail, to co-opt Maximilian of Bavaria as an ally against 
Ferdinand. Additionally, France had sought to persuade Christian IV to continue the 
Protestant war effort, again to no avail. However, in a complex agreement worked out 
between Sweden and Poland-Lithuania, Richelieu’s envoy, Hercule de Charnacé, was 
able to broker peace and extract Gustavus from Poland. Upon brokering this peace (the 
Truce of Almark), Gustavus was persuaded to enter into the fray in the German lands. 
 Once Gustavus invaded, a final factor helped convince the King of Sweden to 
expand his military involvement: the dismissal of Wallenstein. Albrecht von Wallenstein 
had proven himself an able general and a crafty alliance-maker. However, reaction to the 
problems caused by Ferdinand’s overreach in the Edict of Restitution combined with 
alarm at Wallenstein’s growing power, led a group of Imperial Catholic electors to act. 
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Richard Bonney sums up these developments well: “At their electoral meeting at 
Regensburg in August 1630, they forced the dismissal of Waldstein [Wallensein] as 
Imperial generalissimo, refused to elect Frederick II’s son as king of the Romans 
(apparently questioning the Habsburg automatic right of succession to the Imperial title) 
and, most significantly, reduced the size of the Imperial army.”78 Command of the armies 
of the Catholic and the Holy Roman Empire shifted to Count Tilly. Due to this confusion 
in the Imperial forces, King Gustavus Adolphus, the “Lion of the North,” was able to 
make swift and steady progress through Germany from 1630 until early 1631. By January 
of 1631, the northern city of Magdeburg, which was seeking to break free from the grip 
of Ferdinand’s (re)Catholicization, had become Sweden’s operational base. 
 The Protestant cause seemed once again ascendant, but at this very moment the 
war would take a brutal turn. The Thirty Years’ War up to this juncture had already been 
a fierce and bloody affair, with much suffering among the soldiery and peasantry alike. 
However, on “20 May 1631 … the army of the Catholic League, under Tilly and 
Pappenheim, captured and sacked Magdeburg, in what constituted the single worst 
atrocity of the war and certainly the event that was most widely recorded. Practically the 
whole city was destroyed by fire and 24,000 men, women and children are said to have 
died.”79 The city was subjected to not only the fire, but the burning hatred and resentment 
of the Catholic armies. A contemporary eyewitness clearly believed the murder, rape, and 
pillage of the event to be, at least in part, religiously motivated: “Thus it happened that 
the city, with all of its inhabitants, fell into the hands and under the power of its enemies, 
whose fierceness and cruelty came partly out of a common hatred of the adherents of the 
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Augsburg Confession.”80 The Sack of Magdeburg marked a transition point toward 
increased cruelty and violence, especially against non-combatants. 
 After this setback, the Protestants armies of Sweden and its allies were motivated 
to avenge the deeds done at Magdeburg. This vengeance would come quickly in an 
important victory for the Protestants at the First Battle of Breitenfeld on September 17, 
1631. This was the largest battle of the war in sheer numbers of troops and artillery. The 
Saxon-Swedish army numbered between 39-42,000 infantry and cavalry against a force 
of 31-37,000 under Tilly and the joint Catholic League-Imperial army. This battle was a 
smashing victory for the Protestant forces, with Tilly losing somewhere between one-
third to two-thirds of his army. This victory virtually guaranteed that the war would 
continue unabated for years to come. The Protestant cause was emboldened, yet the 
Catholic cause was not fully undone. More bloodshed would be sure to come. 
 The events of Breitenfeld also illustrate the continued, strongly religious view of 
the war among its participants at this juncture. The victory had raised the hopes of 
Protestant leaders for total victory against the Catholics and a new era for Corpus 
Christianum under Lutheran and/or Reformed dominance. In a letter from the Protestant 
ruler, Landgrave William V of Hesse-Cassel, to Gustavus Adolphus this emphasis can be 
clearly seen. William V asserted in the letter that the conflict had always been a religious 
struggle: “[T]he primary cause of the arming of the Evangelicals was freedom of 
conscience.”81 Additionally, he called for the complete removal of Imperial or papal 
influence regarding interpretation of the Augsburg Confession, and by extension, the 
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Peace of Augsburg. Finally, he echoed other calls for vengeance against Roman 
Catholics: “Finally … 1) … the Catholics should be completely and totally disarmed … 
3) That on account of the damages we have sustained, and just as they intended to do 
with us, the papists, must pay Your Royal Majesty and us Evangelicals with their lands 
and people.”82 William’s sentiments resonated well with a Protestant military and 
populace that had suffered greatly under (re)Catholicization and fourteen years of 
Catholic military dominance up to this point in the conflict. Religious factors were still 
dominant. 
 Additionally, the warrant for continuing to call the Thirty Years’ War a religious 
conflict through this stage can be taken from looking at the figure of Gustavus Adolphus 
himself. Due to his Calvinist upbringing and his strong distaste for the Catholic mass, 
Gustavus was firmly a Protestant (though, more Lutheran than Reformed in his 
sensibilities). Additionally, there is little doubt that Gustavus viewed his entire life’s 
mission as emanating from a divine call. He had (seemingly miraculously) survived many 
military incidents in his life, and he had taken these, along with his father’s sense of 
divine providence as marking out his life’s path: 
Such episodes reinforced his faith in divine providence and belief that he was 
doing God’s will. Later writers, like the philosopher Hegel, took the king at his 
word and interpreted him as an instrument of world spirit, destined to unfold 
history. Gustavus grew up with his father’s propaganda that linked the Vasas’ [the 
royal house of Sweden to which Gustavus belonged] dynastic struggle to the 
Protestant cause. He [Gustavus] appears to have sincerely believed that these two 
interests were genuinely the same.
83
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Further evidence of this was the way in which Gustavus’ military was very strictly 
governed with respect to religious devotion and discipline.
84
 Despite the growing political 
motivations of some European powers – particularly France – the conflict up through this 
stage remained one in which committed Protestants and Catholics continued to fight for 
the soul of Corpus Christianum. 
 The Protestant hopes for Christendom were now pinned on the “Lion of the 
North.” Emboldened by success at Breitenfeld and convinced of the favor of God, 
Gustavus and the French-backed, Swedish-German armies pressed forward. Throughout 
the remainder of 1631 and well into 1632, they liberated Protestant areas from Imperial 
control and the oppressive yoke of the Edict of Restitution. Gustavus pushed through the 
territories of Franconia and Thuringia and down the Main and Rhine river valleys. He re-
took the Lower Palatinate and marched into the electorate of Mainz. Here, the Swedish 
army built a “vast military camp, called Gustavusburg, as the base for his conquering 
army.”85 Spirits were high. However, at the height of his power in the German lands, 
Gustavus and the Protestant cause began to falter. Alarmed at the rapid march of the 
Swedish armies, Ferdinand II recalled the deposed Albrecht von Wallenstein. This 
proved to be a key factor in the undoing of Adolphus and in the lengthening of the war. 
The building of a confined military camp (Gustavusburg) also proved to be disastrous. 
The cutting of supply lines by Wallenstein coupled with outbreaks of disease in the 
crowded Swedish encampment brought about a swift reduction in the Swedish numbers. 
Additionally, Wallenstein dispersed his troops into smaller units to combat his army’s 
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own struggles with illness and supply. Bonney credits the above conditions with setting 
the stage for the still-large yet greatly-reduced forces (18,000 for Wallenstein and 
approximately 19,000 for Gustavus) which would engage at the Battle of Lützen on 
November 16, 1632. The battle was largely indecisive except for one crucial event: the 
death of King Gustavus Adolphus. This threw the Protestant, Swedish-led army into 
disarray and decisively turned the conflict from a religious war into a European civil war, 
with Franco-Spanish tensions and full-scale French engagement driving another decade 
and a half of brutal, scorched-earth bloodshed. Setback after setback for the Protestant 
armies would continue until 1634. 
The Thirty Years’ War, Part Deux: 1634-1648 
French Intervention and Secularization of the Conflict (1634/5-1648) 
 After two years of steady setbacks and slackening morale among the Swedish-
Protestant militants, the Imperial forces appeared to be gaining the upper hand. However, 
a seeming “ray of light” for the Protestants came on February 25, 1634 as the ever-
scheming, always-powerful, yet never-trusted generalissimo Albrecht von Wallenstein 
was assassinated due to his attempts to broker a peace with Saxony, Brandenburg, and 
Sweden behind Ferdinand II’s back. Wallenstein was a pivotal figure in the early success 
of the Habsburg-Catholic cause. Nevertheless, his loyalties were often in question: “The 
complexity of his character makes him more difficult to categorize than any of his 
contemporaries; he seems to have been part-mercenary, part-diplomat, and part-political 
aspirant.”86 Whatever, the case, Ferdinand II sent a group of foreign mercenaries to end 
the career and life of Albrecht von Wallenstein. 
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 This seemed to provide an opening for the Swedish-Protestant army. After 
Gustavus’ demise, the overall command of his forces was handed to Bernard of Saxe-
Weimar. Bernard was not as gifted as King Adolphus, but he proved to be a somewhat 
steadying influence. Still, despite Wallenstein’s death and the Protestant stabilization, the 
Imperial-Catholic cause appeared to be near victory. Ferdinand III (the son of the 
Emperor) was given the overall command of the Imperial forces after Wallenstein’s 
demise and was initially very effective. Additionally, his cousin, Fernando, Cardinal-
Infante of Spain, increased the presence and importance of Spain in the conflict. At the 
First Battle of Nӧrdlingen on September 6, 1634, the Imperial-Catholic army, with the 
united forces of the Spanish and Germano-Austrian Habsburg lines, delivered a crushing 
defeat to the Protestant forces. Total victory for the Imperial forces seemed close at hand. 
 It might have been if not for the full-scale involvement of France which came to 
dominate the second half of the Thirty Years’ War. For years, the French minister 
Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, had been the driving force of French 
policy under Louis XIII. In agreements with the United Provinces (a Spanish enemy, the 
northern Netherlands), through the Truce of Almark (which brought Sweden formally 
into the war), and in general attempts to undermine the Germano-Austrian Habsburgs and 
Spanish Habsburgs, Richilieu and France had proven themselves to be Catholic, yes, but 
also the most “political” (in the more modern, secular sense) of all the groups involved in 
the Thirty Years’ War. However, France had largely been content to work the angles 
behind the scenes. This would change quickly and dramatically after tensions with its 
long-term enemy, Spain, were re-sparked on March 26, 1635. Utilizing its position in the 
Spanish Netherlands, the Spaniards attacked the city of Trier in the Palatinate and then 
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captured its French-allied protector, Christoph von Sӧtern. This incident would bring 
France into the war in a formal capacity.  
 The French involvement would come to dominate and unleashed a period where 
the Thirty Years’ War became increasingly secularized. Franco-Spanish tensions, 
mercenary armies, and national-linguistic-regional-state concerns became the dominant 
factors in the conflict. The Thirty Years’ War was no longer centrally religious, but 
increasingly developed into a secular, pan-European war. From 1635 through 1648, the 
Franco-Swedish, mercenary-laden alliance fought the Habsburg partners (Ferdinand II, 
his successor Ferdinand III, and Spain) and, in the process, utterly ravaged the German 
lands. Gustavus Adolphus’ successor, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, knowing that the 
German Protestant princes were either unable or unwilling to join with the Swedes to 
further resist Imperial forces, began to negotiate with France. France successfully became 
the dominant player in the region. 
 Another important aspect to note regarding the entrance of France and the 
secularization of the conflict concerned the dealings of Axel Oxenstierna of Sweden. As 
previously discussed, Gustavus Adolphus was the pivotal figure in the first half of the 
Thirty Years’ War, and he also convinced of a religious, providential direction for his 
prosecution of the struggle.
87
 Yet, it was in cooperation with his trusted Chancellor Axel 
Oxenstierna that Gustavus truly set his course, as seen in his famous remark: “if my 
ardour did not put some life in your phlegm, we should never get anything done at all.”88 
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And, after the king’s death, as Swedish-Protestant forces languished, Oxenstierna’s 
“phlegm” was set to work. As the war went increasingly poorly for Sweden in 1633 and 
1634, the Swedish minister sought to broker a deal with the French while at the same 
time seeking to make peace with Ferdinand II. In the end, France provided the sweeter 
deal, and in the Treaty of Hamburg (March 1638), the terms were set: France would pay 
to finance the army and would continue the fight against the Imperial forces in the 
Rhineland. In return, Sweden would continue the prosecution of the war in the East. With 
Spanish aggression having forced their hand and the compact with the Swedes locking 
them into the conflict, the designs of the French monarchy under the influence of French 
ministers Cardinal Richelieu and later Cardinal Mazarin came to the forefront. 
 With France’s formal entrance into the war, the Swedish-Protestant forces were 
stabilized. Johan Báner, a rising Swedish marshal, supplanted Bernard of Saxe-Weimar 
as the commander of the Swedish forces after Bernard’s death and, along with generals 
Lennart Tortennson and Alexander Leslie, won a decisive victory over Imperial forces at 
the Battle of Wittstock on October 4, 1636. However, just as it again appeared that the 
anti-Habsburg armies were winning, setbacks came throughout 1637. These were short-
lived, though, and with the solidification of a politically-based, anti-Habsburg alliance 
between France and Sweden through the aforementioned Treaty of Hamburg, the 
eventual weakening of Imperial power began. Along with France’s renewed capital 
support came Oxenstierna’s gift of 14,000 new recruits for Báner from Sweden. This 
allowed him to push deeper into German lands, and at the Battle of Chemnitz in Saxony, 
on 14 April 1639, Báner inflicted a major defeat on the Imperial army under Archduke 
Leopold-William, Ferdinand III’s brother. This opened up the route into Silesia and 
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Bohemia and Báner made further advances. In 1640, the forces of Sweden and France 
joined their war effort together; meeting at Erfurt, they began pushing into Bavaria. 
 The death of Báner on May 20, 1641 was a momentary setback. This led to a 
mutiny among the Swedish forces – many of whom were mercenaries that had not been 
receiving their pay. However, by November of 1641, the army stabilized as Tortennson, 
Gustavus’ artillery commander and Báner’s right-hand man, was appointed by 
Chancellor Oxenstierna as the head of the Swedish forces. After some minor gains and 
victories, Tortennson, though outnumbered, won a significant victory at the Second 
Battle of Breitenfeld on November 2, 1642. Additionally, in a further illustration of the 
growing irreligiousness of the war, Tortennson defeated a Danish army (Lutheran-
Protestants) as they sought to re-enter the war in 1644, this time as allies of the pro-
Catholic Imperial Forces. 
 With a few setbacks, the final stretch of the war moved closer. French forces 
devastated a Spanish force of 18,000 men at the Battle of Rocroi on 19 May 1643. Joint 
Franco-Weimar forces suffered a small setback on 24 November 1643 at the Battle of 
Tuttlingen which briefly emboldened the Imperial forces and led Maximilian of Bavaria 
to call upon Emperor Ferdinand III for reinforcements. However, in 1645, Tortennson 
resolutely reclaimed the areas of Bohemia and Moravia which were lost in the Danish re-
incursion into the war. At the Battle of Jankow on 6 March 1645, Tortennson dealt a 
devastating defeat to the Imperial forces and began marching toward Vienna, the 
Austrian capital. Emperor Ferdinand III fled to Graz. From this point, the Imperial 
position continued to weaken. 
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 The gains in the East by the Swedish army were not initially replicated by the 
French armies in the West. The French general Henri Turenne suffered losses in the early 
part of 1645. However, joining together with Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé (the 
Great Condé), Turenne crushed the Imperial Army at the Second Battle of Nӧrdlingen on 
6 August 1645. After this devastating loss, the Imperial forces, particularly those fielded 
by Maximilian of Bavaria, were stretched to the limit. At this point, the Swedish under 
Tortennson and Wrangel, along with the French under Turenne joined forces. This was 
mildly objected to by the French minister Cardinal Mazarin because the Swedish 
commanders, particularly the dominating figure of Karl Gustav Wrangel, were proud and 
unpopular figures who threatened the French. Mazarin was wary of ceding the French 
army to the control of what was now a superior Swedish force. However, Turenne, 
though French, was a Huguenot, and as a Calvinist had a strong desire to crush the 
Catholic Emperor in addition to undermining Habsburg power. The joint Franco-Swedish 
force quickly cut off the Bavarian forces under Archduke Leopold-William. By August 
19, 1646 Maximilian of Bavaria was forced to flee to Munich. From there, he opened up 
negotiations and in the Treaty of Ulm (March 14, 1647) negotiated between France, 
Sweden, and Bavaria he abandoned his alliance with Ferdinand III.  
 Maximilian broke the Treaty of Ulm and shifted back into alliance with 
Ferdinand III in September of 1647. It was to no avail. A final consolidation of the 
Swedish and French armies set the stage for the almost complete annihilation of the 
Imperial-Bavarian military at the Battle of Zusmarshausen on May 17, 1648. Finally, the 
Thirty Years’ War would come to a close. The last major battle of the war was the Battle 
of Prague which commenced on July 26, 1648 when Swedish general Hans Christoff von 
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Kӧnigsmarck was able to enter a portion of the city and recapture Prague Castle. This 
brought the conflict full-circle, to the very location where the Defenestration of Prague 
and Bohemian Rebellion had, thirty years prior, launched the devastation. The Swedish 
forces were unable to take the entire city and, shortly thereafter, the series of treaties 
negotiated at Osnabrück and Münster in Westphalia were signed and ratified, becoming 
completed in October of 1648 and known collectively as the Peace of Westphalia. 
 The final half of the war was dizzying in its pace and the alliances it engendered. 
It was increasingly fought for secularized reasons, despite having a religious veneer. 
Catholic France united with the Dutch-Reformed United Provinces against Catholic 
(though Habsburg) Spain. Additionally, France led the victory charge for Protestantism 
with Sweden – against the Catholic power of the Habsburgs in Germany. Denmark had 
been the Protestant standard-bearer for a time from 1625-1629; however, she entered the 
fray against her fellow Lutherans in 1644. While the period from 1618-1632 certainly 
included some territorial motivations, it was the second half of the war under French 
ascendancy that transformed the conflict into a secularized venture.  With the weakened 
situation in Germany after the first half of the war, it was perhaps to be expected that 
powers with colonial designs would seek to fill the vacuum of power. As part three is 
ended, we will next shift attention to the aftermath of the war. What will be seen is that 
the Thirty Years’ War – always vicious and devastating – will prove to have sown the 
seeds for the undoing of Corpus Christianum and the undermining of Christianity and 
religion in the Western World.  
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PART 3 
THE END OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR AND  
THE AFTERMATH FOR CORPUS CHRISTIANUM 
 Friedrich Schiller surmised that the turn from religious motivation toward 
political power-grabbing could be seen even prior to France’s formal involvement in the 
figure of the Swedish hero, Gustavus Adolphus. Schiller remarked, “[I]t was no longer 
the benefactor of Germany who fell at Lützen: the beneficent part of his career, Gustavus 
Adolphus had already terminated; and now the greatest service which he could render to 
the liberties of Germany was – to die. The all-encompassing power of an individual was 
at an end.”89 Schiller’s words could, and perhaps more aptly, should be applied to 
religion as practiced and conceived in Corpus Christianum. For, in the aftermath of the 
Thirty Years’ War, the “all-encompassing power of religion” in the Western world would 
come to a close.   
 This thesis has argued that religious motivations were central in the Thirty Years’ 
War’s first half (1618-1632/33) and that the ascendancy of French political motivations 
and a colonializing, nation-state brawl came to characterize the conflict’s second period 
(1634/35-1648). This can nowhere be seen more clearly than in the Peace of Westphalia 
and the effects of the war on the generations following 1648. In order to examine the 
results of the conflict for Corpus Christianum, this thesis shall now turn to an assessment 
of the Peace of Westphalia, especially its role as a founding charter for secular 
government (though it was not a fully secular document). Next, a summary of the 
reordering which flowed from Westphalia shall be given. Lastly, a brief look at the 
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devastation of the conflict for Germany and Europe will commence, concluding with the 
assertion that the true devastation produced by the Thirty Years’ War was the collapse of 
Corpus Christianum. From this collapse, the Western world would witness the rise of the 
Enlightenment, secularization, and absolute monarchy as Christendom receded. 
The Peace of Westphalia 
 The Peace of Westphalia, which formally ended the Thirty Years’ War, was made 
up of two separate treaties.
90
 The Peace of Osnabrück (Intrsumentum Pacis 
Osnabrugense or IPO) formally ended hostilities between the Empire and Sweden and 
served as a new Imperial constitution across the Empire. The Peace of Münster 
(Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriense or IPM) worked out issues between the Empire and 
France, while excluding certain issues such as French occupation of the duchy of 
Lorraine. Yet, the Westphalian Settlement was not merely a dividing up of territory. 
Instead, it was a religious, political, and territorial compromise which was put forth as a 
new Imperial constitution and a definitive statement on the 1555 religious settlement in 
the Peace of Augsburg. 
 The negotiations were highly complex, and the settlement took more than four 
years to complete. This complexity has prompted one scholar to remark:  
 The first peace conference of modern times was a law unto itself. The 
negotiations were handled by 176 plenipotentiaries (almost half of them lawyers 
by profession) who acted for 194 European rulers, great and small. Not all of the 
states represented at the congress sent delegations of their own – only 109 did so 
– but nevertheless several thousand diplomatic personnel thronged the streets of 
Münster and Osnabrück between 1643 and 1648. The size of the various 
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embassies ranged from 200 men, women and children in the French delegation to 
the lone envoys of the smaller German principalities.”91 
  
 The Peace of Westphalia covered much ground, but can be roughly summarized 
as follows. First, it granted a general amnesty for all involved in the violence of the war 
(Article II of IPO). Second, it reasserted and defined the right of princes to administer 
allocations of church property. Importantly, it stipulated that all allocations would revert 
back to their condition on January 1, 1624 (Article V, Sec. 2 & 31 of IPO). This was seen 
as a date which would be fair to Roman Catholics while undoing the seizures of the 
Empire and Roman Catholic Church in the Edict of Restitution. Third, it undercut the 
principle of cuius regio, eius religio set forth in the Peace of Augsburg and located proper 
interpretation of the religious peace within the Westphalian settlement itself: “Regarding 
the controversial articles in the present treaty, whatever was agreed to by common 
consent [at Westphalia] shall be considered a perpetual declaration of the said peace 
[i.e., Peace of Augsburg].”92 Fourth, it broadened the religious peace to include 
“Reformed” Protestants (Art. VII, Sec. 1 of IPO]. Fifth, it strengthened and “birthed” the 
secular idea of private religious principle vs. public life (Article V, Sec. 34). Finally, it 
articulated various conditions which would govern the relationships of the powers 
involved, and it formally established territorial gains and/or losses from the war.  
 Each of the above issues was important. However, it was the way that the 
Westphalian settlement dealt with religion that particularly stood out. While the Peace of 
Westphalia was not a fully secular document, it nonetheless enshrined important 
principles that would come to govern Western nations from that point forward. Two of 
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these principles, in particular, would represent the establishment of a proto-secular order. 
Benjamin Straumann crystallizes the importance of this development: “Westphalia … 
established a secular order by taking sovereignty over religious affairs away from the 
discretion of territorial princes and by establishing a proto-liberal legal distinction 
between private and public affairs.”93 These two issues, along with the declaration that 
the once-hated Reformed groups would also share equal legal status in Europe, cemented 
the growing importance of nation-states and political entities vis-à-vis religious issues 
and the Church.  
 Nowhere is this move toward favoring nation-state politics over religion seen 
more clearly than in the treatment of the papal delegations at the peace proceedings. 
Initially, in a very Corpus Christianum-like way, the papal delegation was given a 
favored role. However, this was not to last:  
 When Rome would not sanction any Catholic concessions to the Protestants, or 
even to accord them diplomatic recognition, the powers found that they could do 
without papal services. … The final, and unheeded, protest by Innocent X [Pope 
from 1644-1655] against the peace treaties … showed starkly the gulf between the 
political-religious claims of the papacy and the realities of European political 
life.
94
  
 
In this incident, as well as in the general tenor of the Westphalian negotiations, was a 
decisive turn away from the religio-social, political amalgam that had dominated the 
Western world for well over a thousand years. Again, while the Peace of Westphalia dealt 
with many religious issues, it was its subordination of sacred concerns to those of the 
state which signaled that the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War would also bring to a 
close the story of Corpus Christianum. From Westphalia forward, many of the national 
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and political concerns of the modern Western world became visible. It is important at this 
point to briefly summarize some of the specific political outcomes for the powers 
represented at Osnabrück and Münster and to briefly comment on their significance. 
The Establishment of a New Order After the Peace of Westphalia 
Outcomes for the Habsburgs 
 The Thirty Years’ War not only proved to be the end of the Habsburg dream of a 
Christendom reunited under Roman Catholicism, it also proved to be the undoing of 
Habsburg hegemony in European affairs. The Spanish-Habsburg line would come to an 
abrupt end in 1706 with the death of the physically and mentally handicapped Charles II. 
This severely curtailed the wealth and resources of the Habsburg monarchs. Never again 
would Europe be controlled between the designs of an allied front made up of Habsburgs 
from Spain and Austria. 
 Nonetheless, the House of Habsburg in Austria would survive, even thrive. 
Though Ferdinand III accepted a diminished role in wider German and European affairs, 
Austria, with its capital at Vienna, became a much more centralized power. This 
consolidation of Habsburg holdings, along with the Westphalian settlement’s general 
strengthening of state power vis-à-vis religious concerns produced an Austria which was 
allowed to pursue its own religious and political policies. Austria became a power in its 
own right and remained a bastion of Roman Catholicism. It was the undisputed center of 
what remained of Habsburg rule and would continue to exert influence in Germany until 
its defeat in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. 
Outcomes for Germany and the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” 
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 The German lands of the Holy Roman Empire were ravaged by the Thirty Years’ 
War. In addition, the political structure of Germany was left in tatters. As Stephen Lee 
has insightfully remarked: “Between 1648 and its eventual dissolution by Napoleon in 
1806, the Empire never again functioned as a political unit. The future belonged, instead, 
to a select number of individual states.”95 The vacuum of power created by the Empire’s 
demise left three important problems for the German states. First, they had to deal with 
the practical outworking of the Westphalian settlement – a settlement which left no real 
mechanism for dealing with litigation from the war. Second, few overarching political 
structures were left intact as there was no longer an Empire-wide constitution. Third, 
each of the German states was left with the yeoman task of repairing war-time damage 
and creating a climate for renewed economic development. The states that were most 
successful in dealing with these challenges were those which grew in power. 
 In addition to the above mentioned problems, there was another practical reality 
held over from the Thirty Years’ War – the profound potential for armed conflict among 
states now competing for political and economic dominance in the German lands. 
Richard Bonney has insightfully summarized the situation: “The Peace of Westphalia left 
Germany as a profoundly militarized society, with a strong potential for internecine 
conflict.”96 
 The growing competition among select German states coupled with the military 
build-up during and after the Thirty Years’ War would profoundly affect the future of 
Germany. Ultimately, Brandenburg-Prussia would grow to be the most dominant power 
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in the German lands and entered into prolonged rivalry and conflict with the remaining 
House of Habsburg in Austria. Several reasons for the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia can be 
deduced. First, it made out very favorably in the Westphalian settlement, gaining its 
historic holdings as well as the important duchy of Magdeburg. Second, Brandenburg-
Prussia had repeatedly been marched across and devastated during the war. As a result, 
when the conflict was ended a concerted effort was made to strengthen its military 
defenses. Third, when the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV of France unleashed a fresh 
wave of persecution on Huguenots in France, Brandenburg-Prussia sought to draw in the 
immigrants who had been hardened in battle. This contributed to the military strength of 
Brandenburg-Prussia and provided, through the religious sensibilities of Reformed 
Christianity, a strong sense of Prussian destiny. Ultimately, this potent mix of factors 
would come forth through the Napoleonic Wars and would fashion Brandenburg-Prussia 
into a formidable power. Prussia eventually defeated France under Napoleon III and 
defeated Austria-Hungary in 1866 to create a German Empire with Prussia as its head in 
1871. The German tendency toward militarism and domination as witnessed in the world 
wars of the twentieth-century had many of its roots formed in the situation that grew out 
of the Thirty Years’ War. 
Outcomes for Sweden 
 Though Sweden, under Gustavus Adolphus, had turned the tide of the conflict, 
eventually the Thirty Years’ War would exact a heavy toll from Sweden. Sweden 
received considerable land holdings in Germany and a cash settlement of 5 million 
thalers. However, despite its gains, Sweden struggled: “Unlike France, Sweden accepted 
its gains as full imperial Estates, giving it representation in the Reichstag as well as the 
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Lower and Upper Saxon assemblies. … [However] Swedish authority remained curtailed 
by imperial law.”97 This decision to administer its gains within the Westphalian 
construction of the reconfigured Holy Roman Empire all but insured that Sweden gained 
almost nothing for its own kingdom. Tax proceeds and natural resources rarely benefited 
Sweden proper and instead were funneled back into its German holdings for 
administration and operation. The Swedish monarchy became embroiled in civil conflict 
from independence movements and failed to strengthen its position in Germany. It 
swiftly receded from the international scene and by the early eighteenth-century it was no 
longer a formidable power in Europe. 
Outcomes for France 
 Arguably, France gained more from the Thirty Years’ War than any other 
European power. Stephen Lee’s summation of the situation illustrates France’s situation 
after the war: ““[T]here can be little doubt that the period from 1648 onwards saw the 
completion of most of Richilieu’s original ambitions: the separation of the Spanish and 
Austrian Habsburgs, the expansion of the French frontier into the Empire, and the 
substitution of French for Spanish military supremacy in Europe.”98 Additionally, France 
not only became militarily superior to Spain, she essentially ended Spanish influence in 
Europe. Under the conditions of the Peace of Westphalia, Spanish territories were given 
to France – even though the Franco-Spanish conflict would not be completed until 1659.  
 Nonetheless, though France was ascendant, the seeds for her downfall were also 
sown during this period. France’s victory and subsequent rise went hand-in-hand with the 
growing dominance of the monarchy. Julian Swann writes, “[O]nce France had officially 
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listed the Thirty Years’ War in 1635, the government’s desperate need for funds obliged 
it to circumvent traditional judicial and administrative officeholders, whose loyalty and 
efficiency were questioned.”99 This situation under Louis XIII led to a crippling of the 
aristocratic nobility in France. After the Thirty Years’ War, the French would struggle 
through a series of civil wars known as La Fronde. During the Fronde, aristocratic nobles 
sought to curtail the abuses of the monarchy. The revolts were put down handily, and 
afterward Louis XIV strengthened his throne into an “absolute monarchy.” Upon his 
death, the aristocratic nobility sought to regain power during the reigns of Louis XV and 
XVI. However, due to their efforts to reclaim privileged status, they ultimately crippled 
efforts for egalitarian reforms, with devastating effects: 
 According to this interpretation, the death of Louis XIV was followed almost 
immediately by a reaction of powerful privileged groups led by the parlements, 
the Catholic Church and the court aristocracy. Their largely selfish opposition to 
egalitarian reform of the fiscal system paved the way to the royal bankruptcy that 
preceded the revolution of 1789.
100
 
 
 In just over a hundred years, France would see her stock fall from the heights of 
her triumph over Spain and the Habsburgs. The French Revolution plunged the country 
into terrible ruin, paving the way for the rise of the dictator Napoleon. After Napoleon’s 
eventual defeat, the West saw the long decline of French fortunes (despite her colonial 
gains). 
Outcomes for Spain and the Netherlands 
 France’s longtime enemy, Spain, began the Thirty Years’ War as a still-dominant 
power in Europe with a strong position as one part of the powerful Habsburg line. By the 
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end of the conflict, Spain effectively ceased to be an independent, imperial power.  It was 
forced to make many concessions in the Treaty of Westphalia. Knowing that war with 
France was still a reality, “Philip IV drew the logical conclusion from this situation and 
came to terms with the United Provinces. Spanish recognition of the complete 
independence of the United Provinces and the closing of the Scheldt were hard to 
swallow but did not call for any change in the position as it had existed for many 
years.”101  
 The Spanish monarch thought that ending the long war with the Dutch would free 
Spain to focus on finally defeating the French and regaining a foothold as a dominant 
force in European politics. However, this was not to be the case. Without its Dutch 
holdings and saddled with extreme debt, Spain grew too weak to continue to fund its 
military and expansionist obligations. The Dutch had gained their independence and 
France was now the strongest state in the region. For Spain, the world had turned on its 
head. She would retreat into absolute monarchy and entrenched Roman Catholicism, 
never again to rise to her former glory. 
Outcomes for Wider Europe 
 As the Thirty Years’ War came to a close with the Peace of Westphalia, a 
recognizably “modern” Europe was emerging. Though different in combination and exact 
borders from its twenty-first century form, the reshaping of the Western world would 
produce a recognizable nation-state of France, the beginnings of German unification 
under Prussian (Brandenburg-Prussia) power, the bloc of Austria-Hungary, an 
independent Netherlands, a diminished-but-independent Spain, a small-but-independent 
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Sweden and Denmark, and a free Switzerland (largely uninvolved in the war, but still 
included in the terms of the peace). The power blocs that would come to dominate 
Europe into the twentieth century also began to emerge at this time. Even England – 
largely disengaged and unaffected during the war – was in the process of working 
through its own religious questions and would eventually emerge as a strong, 
“secularized” power in early modern Europe. 
 Europe was transformed as secularized political life and detectably “modern” 
national boundaries rose from the ashes of Corpus Christianum: 
 The treaty gave the Swiss independence of Austria and the Netherlands 
independence of Spain. The German principalities secured their autonomy. 
Sweden gained territory and a payment in cash. Brandenburg and Bavaria made 
gains too, and France acquired most of Alsace-Lorraine. The prospect of a Roman 
Catholic reconquest of Europe vanished forever.
102
 
 
In fact, the religio-social, political framework of Corpus Christianum had been 
irrevocably altered. 
The Toll of the War on Germany, Europe, and the Western World 
The Reshaping of the Psyche of Germany and Europe 
In addition to the rise of secularized, nation-state politics over/against a Church-
state nexus, as well as the reshaping of boundaries along national-ethnic-territorial lines, 
the psyche of Germany and Europe was remade as a result of the Thirty Years’ War. 
Modern scholarship has widely debated the extent of a “cultural myth” of devastation and 
suffering drawn from Germany’s experience in the Thirty Years’ War.103 In the wake of 
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World War I and World War II some scholars were reluctant to “coddle” Germans as 
victims. However, Randall Hansen has penned an important statement regarding this 
tendency: “Scholars began to write about the ‘myth’ of suffering and total destruction 
during the Thirty Years’ War. Yet, even this scholarship did not nullify the claim that 
destruction and suffering were meted out on a previously unprecedented scale.”104  
 It is true that certain areas of Germany were repeatedly destroyed while others 
were little-touched. Yet, in the final analysis, the German countryside, as well as the 
peasant population of the German lands, was shattered. Heinze remarks, “The big losers 
in the war were the German people. For thirty years armies had lived off the land, 
looting, raping, and destroying. The empire suffered very severe population losses. It is 
estimated that there may have been as many as eight million fewer inhabitants in 
Germany at the end of the war than there were in the beginning.”105 Again, while it is 
plausible to accept that a significant number of reports were exaggerated, even false, the 
suffering of the populace was very real. In fact, one scholar has argued that the “rhetoric 
of death and destruction” in contemporary accounts of the war was a part of the shared 
reality of the populace. In other words, even if some of the rhetoric was not factual, it 
gave voice to the very real grief and suffering of the people during the war, a grief and 
suffering that became a palpable part of the social fabric of German life.
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 The suffering of the populace and the attendant destruction, in the German lands 
but also in wider Europe, was truly horrific. Estimates for the population loss in Germany 
run from a high of 40% to a low of 20%. For the peasant population, mistreatment at the 
hands of mercenary soldiers was a constant fear. Additionally, aside from the threat of 
physical violence, famine and disease were ever-present realities. By any account, the 
Thirty Years’ War was a time of deep desolation and it profoundly affected the populace.  
The “Collapse” of Corpus Christianum 
 The tremendous suffering actually experienced by the population, as well as the 
shared consciousness of devastation and loss in the popular psyche, was not without its 
effect on religion: 
 [T]hough the Reformation had been saved, it suffered, along with Catholicism, 
from a skepticism encouraged by the coarseness of religious polemics, the 
brutality of the war, and the cruelties of belief. … Men began to doubt creeds that 
preached Christ and practiced wholesale fratricide. They discovered the political 
and economic motives that hid under religious formulas, and they suspected their 
rulers of having no real faith but the lust for power.
107
 
 
In short, the greatest casualty of the Thirty Years’ War was the loss of a defined nexus of 
religio-social, political meaning as previously provided in Corpus Christianum. 
 Historians, for all of their wrangling over whether or not the Thirty Years’ War 
was truly fought for religious reasons, are largely united in seeing that the overarching 
result of the conflict was the un-mendable fracture of the Christian ordering of the 
Western world that had lasted for more than a millennia. For instance, Koenigsberger 
writes, “After 1648 there was a real change. Religion might still produce sympathy or 
antipathy between states, but it no longer determined alliances nor did it lead countries 
into war. From 1648 until the French Revolution the European states were engaged in 
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pure power struggles.”108 The militancy and brutality of professing Christians against one 
another had discredited the militant viewpoint that sought to forcibly unite all of society 
under the banner of a single, unified Christendom.
109
 
 Even the Church as an institution was called deeply into question. Mark Noll 
comments, “Recent historians have suggested that the churches may have been used as 
puppets by military imperialists in this struggle, but the war still led to a growing sense 
that it was necessary to reduce the visibility of religion in order to have peace in the day-
to-day life of European nations.”110 While official designations of a region as “Lutheran,” 
or “Catholic,” or “Reformed,” continued to exist, there was never again in the Western 
world a return to the holistic religio-social, political conception of reality as witnessed in 
Corpus Christianum. In truth, skepticism regarding the practicality and truthfulness of 
religion – especially Christianity – would begin to take deep root in the Western world. 
Christendom ceased to be the dominant reality of Early Modern Europe: “[W]ith the 
religious divisions caused by the Reformation and Counter-reformation, [people] had lost 
the last shreds of the never very strong medieval feelings for the communitas 
Christianiae, the community of Christendom.”111  
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New Worldviews and Structures for a Post-Christendom World 
The Rise of Secularization and the Enlightenment 
 With the collapse of Corpus Christianum and the cessation of hostilities new 
structures and attitudes began to be adopted. Ironically, “the religious wars played a 
major role in bringing about a degree of toleration, since neither party was able to 
annihilate the other, and the participants emerged from these lengthy wars too exhausted 
to continue trying to achieve religious unity by the suppression of the opposition.”112 This 
growing religious toleration became a fertile ground for ‘tolerating’ other viewpoints – 
even the skeptical attitude which had begun to inundate modern science and philosophy. 
A long march toward secularization in the Western world was commenced and the 
Enlightenment was born. 
 The Enlightenment was (and is) a notoriously flexible concept. Suffice it to say, 
though, at its core it was motivated by a growing confidence in reason, scientific 
endeavor, and human progress. The Enlightenment era rose from the ashes of the Thirty 
Years’ War and stretched from the middle decades of the seventeenth century up through 
the late eighteenth century. It was marked by impressive discoveries about the natural 
world, and revolutions in philosophy and the social order. Additionally, it was decidedly 
irreligious. Religion did not recede completely during this era. In fact, attempts were 
made by certain powers – notably France and Spain – to retrench and reestablish a 
modified version of Corpus Christianum. However, even these attempts would be 
quelled. The Enlightenment was a period of growing secularization and it marked the 
beginning of the West’s reformulation under a decidedly non-religious banner. Certainly, 
important exceptions to this general trend would come to the fore. The Great Awakening 
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of the eighteenth century in England and the British colonies constituted one important 
example. Yet, even in times of religious revival, the religio-social, political order of the 
Western world was never again to be characterized by an all-encompassing church-state 
bond. Enlightenment figure Denis Diderot famously summed up the new outlook: “Never 
shall man be free until the last king has been strangled with the entrails of the last 
priest.”113  
 As the Durants remarked, “Even in this darkest of modern ages an increasing 
number of men turned to science and philosophy for answers less incarnadined than those 
which the faiths had so violently sought to enforce. … The Peace of Westphalia ended 
the reign of theology over the European mind, and left the road obstructed but passable 
for the tentatives of reason.”114 The general intellectual and cultural milieu of the era was 
a fertile ground for the growing secularization of society. Aside from a few short-lived 
exceptions, former-Christendom began a decisive move toward a thoroughly secularized 
future. In the German lands, particularly, the growing power of Brandenburg-Prussia was 
largely due to a decision to unite around German language, German culture, and 
militarization.
115
 In every corner in which Corpus Christianum had once been the rule, 
new democratic structures, which were not dependent on the church, began to grow. The 
Peace of Westphalia and the religious exhaustion which had been brought on by the 
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Thirty Years’ War helped to birth the Enlightenment and ensured that never again would 
anything like the “medieval synthesis” of Corpus Christianum exist. 
Absolute Monarchy: Corpus Christianum Revisited and Found Wanting 
 The notable, though temporary, exceptions to the secularizing trend were the 
absolute monarchies that rose in several of the nation-states of former-Christendom. 
Many of these failed quickly. A few, especially England and the Netherlands, emerged to 
become exemplars of the post-Christendom world: 
 The greatest transformations occurred in the United Provinces and in England. 
There, compromise solutions were found: mixed constitutions, the emancipation 
of intellectual life from clerical control, and the development of open and flexible, 
even though highly differentiated, social structures. These were the differences 
which were to determine the course of European history for the next hundred and 
fifty years.
116
 
 
 However, this was not the case with a few of the important Catholic powers, 
particularly France and Spain. In each of these countries, the privileged status of Roman 
Catholicism under the rule of a divinely appointed monarch was reasserted. In a very 
important sense, this represented an attempt to reestablish Corpus Christianum, albeit in a 
modified form. This attempt was most successfully carried out in France under the 
absolute monarchy of the “Sun King,” Louis XIV. During his reign, France grew as an 
important power, the Roman Catholic faith was elevated, and the power of the monarch 
to control that faith was practiced.  
 Louis XV and XVI attempted to carry forward this reformulated Corpus 
Christianum. However, the re-visitation of Christendom under the system of absolute 
monarchy would eventually succumb to the secular force of the Enlightenment age. This 
led to the French Revolution and the unraveling of French society in the “Reign of 
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Terror.” Out of the ashes of this reign would raise the new attempt to find a universal 
organizing principle for the Western world, the universal state. Napoleon Bonaparte 
sought to bring France and the world under his rule. His eventual defeat did not lead 
France or Europe back toward a fusion of Christianity and political life. Instead, in the 
now very secularized states of Europe, attempts at universalizing secular rule were made 
through colonial ventures. Eventually, tensions between the European powers led to 
German ascendance and the conditions that led up to the world wars of the twentieth 
century. 
 In the final analysis, Christendom was finished. Many factors had converged 
during the seventeenth century to ensure that that the Western world was pushed toward 
what scholars discuss as the “General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century.”117 Whatever 
one concludes about the general upheaval of that era, it is demonstrably true that the 
period after the Thirty Years’ War was the beginning of a new religio-social, political 
journey for the West. From the Peace of Westphalia forward, former-Christendom was 
reshaped and reformulated into the world of modernity, characterized by Enlightenment 
rationality, secularized politics, and the privatization of religious sentiment. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Norman Davies, in his massive tome, Europe: A History wrote, “The Thirty Years 
War … may be seen as an episode in the age-old German conflict between Emperor and 
princes. At another level, it may be seen as an extension of the international wars of 
religion between Catholic and Protestant; at yet another, as an important stage in a 
Continental power-struggle involving most of the states and rulers of Europe.”118 All of 
this is true. However, this thesis has argued more specifically that the Thirty Years’ War 
was essentially religious in its beginnings, secular and “political” by its end, and that it 
spelled the doom of Christendom. In fact, it was the last gasp for the religio-social, 
political conglomerate known as Corpus Christianum. 
Brief Summary of the Contours of this Study 
 By taking a “long view” of the origins of the conflict, the case was made that the 
Thirty Years’ War, while multi-faceted, was an essentially religious conflict in its 
beginnings through its first half. The parties which found themselves at war in the lands 
of the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” starting in 1618 were seeking to 
stabilize the centuries old church-state nexus which had encompassed their world for 
centuries and which had been destabilized by the Protestant Reformation. In the events of 
the first half of the Thirty Years’ War, religious concerns and motivations were primary, 
as the reunification of Christendom under a united church-state was sought. The 
Bohemian revolt was fought by Calvinists who sought to resist the attempts of the 
Catholic Habsburgs. The incursion of Denmark under King Christian IV was motivated 
by his desire to come to the rescue of Protestantism, particularly the Lutheranism which 
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he shared with many of the German princes. The Swedish phase, especially under 
Gustavus Adolphus, was an attempt to work out the providential ascendancy of the 
Protestant cause so that Christendom could be united under true religion. Whatever other 
motivations were present, a discernable and central religious motivation can be seen in 
the first part of the Thirty Years’ War as the combatants battled for the heart of Corpus 
Christianum. 
 Nevertheless, as the conflict progressed, it became clear that neither side could 
achieve religious or military dominance over the other. At this point, and especially after 
France’s formal entrance into the fighting in 1635, the Thirty Years’ War devolved into 
unprincipled carnage and chaos dominated by nation-state goals and ends. The last fifteen 
years of the conflict would continue to pit ostensibly “Protestant” and “Catholic” armies 
against one another. However, this was no longer even superficially true. Roman Catholic 
France fought the Roman Catholic Habsburgs of Germany and Spain for reasons of 
political and territorial advantage and not religious principle. In the Protestant armies, 
much religious motivation was lost when Gustavus Adolphus died. Mercenaries came to 
dominate the conflict as the German lands and Europe descended into death, destruction, 
and devastation. The folly of Christians maiming and killing one another in the name of 
the Prince of Peace became apparent and the stage was set for religion to recede as a 
unifying animus in the Western world. 
 The Peace of Westphalia would cement the collapse of Corpus Christianum as the 
territorial and/or nation-state ruler was given authority over religious disputes and 
religious sensibility began to be pushed into the private world of the individual believer. 
Additionally, the hatred and violence, which had been carried out in the name of the 
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Christian religion, began to undermine the very idea of religion itself. Enlightenment 
rationality and secularized political thinking took hold. Brief attempts at returning to 
Corpus Christianum were eventually crushed, and a recognizably modern world began to 
emerge. Events and conditions coalesced which would eventually give rise to the modern 
Western world. 
Closing Thoughts 
 As this study comes to a close, it is perhaps appropriate to go beyond 
summarization to an evaluation of the results of the Thirty Years’ War. If the casualty of 
the war truly was Corpus Christianum, the question must be asked: was this a good 
consequence or not? Should religion be kept fundamentally separate from the life of the 
polis? Was Constantine wrong? Was Augustine right in theory but wrong in practice?  
 It is tempting quickly to answer, “Yes!” Yet, this would be too simple. Robert 
Markus, in his landmark study on history and society in the thought of Augustine offers 
an important word at this juncture:  
 For the polis-centered tradition of Greek thought the political framework of 
human life was the chief means of achieving human perfection. Life in a city-state 
was an education for virtue, a fully human life, the good life. Politics was a 
creative task. …  
  In Judaeo-Christian tradition the key-note of political thinking was 
different. The people of God, whether of the old or the new Covenants, could not 
think of themselves as citizens involved in creating the right order in society, nor 
of their leaders as entrusted with bringing such an order into being. Only God’s 
saving act could establish the one right social order. In relation to that kingdom 
they were subjects, not agents; in relation to all other, human, kingdoms, they 
were aliens rather than citizens. In relation to neither God’s nor men’s kingdoms 
could they therefore think of themselves as active participants in a creative 
political task. …  
  Although Augustine came to repudiate the ‘creative’ conception of politics 
characteristic of the classical tradition, this was only the first major development 
of his own political reflection. In the end he was not content with this rejection. In 
the final phase of his thought there is an obstinate sense of a need to give more 
weight to the political order than it could bear in the perspective of a stark, 
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biblical repudiation of ‘creative’ politics. A way had to be found for reconciling 
the Christian’s sense of having no abiding city here with some real political 
participation in a commitment to a city which was far from an abiding one.
119
 
 The point communicated in the preceding paragraphs is an important one as we 
evaluate the outcomes of the Thirty Years’ War. Earlier in this thesis, a somewhat critical 
view of Augustine’s “inconsistencies” regarding the idea of a distinct-in-theory, but 
united-in-practice civitas dei and civitas terrena was espoused. However, it is now time 
to qualify that view. The struggles of Christendom, especially as they were played out in 
the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War, understandably led to the politically secular nation-
states of the modern era. However, have the horrors of the modern nation-state been any 
less dramatic than the travails of the church-state? Many, including this author, would 
argue that the answer to that question is a resounding, “No!” Why is this so? Could it be 
that the once-revered, now-dismissed genius Arnold J. Toynbee was correct when he 
warned that the disintegration of society would be the result of a universal (secular) 
state?
120
 Again, this author thinks that he was correct and agrees with the sentiment: 
“Nihilistic politics arises when the modern state reassumes the role of sacrificer but then 
realizes there are no more gods to receive the sacrifice – no more gods but itself.”121  
 The Thirty Years’ War originated because the Church had largely lost the ability 
to exist apart from the state. As the Protestant Reformation reawakened many toward the 
essentially prophetic stance of the Church in relation to the polis and the world, massive 
conflict ensued. Corpus Christianum, as the dominant religio-social, political reality was 
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a necessary casualty of this conflict. However, perhaps the baby was thrown out with the 
proverbial bathwater. Religious toleration and freedom of conscience were and are 
important and necessary realities for peace on this earth. However, the radical 
secularization that largely removed Christianity from Western, public life after the Thirty 
Years’ War led not to peace but instead set in place conditions, which would eventually 
contribute to the devastating world wars and Communist revolutions of the twentieth 
century. Perhaps now, over three and a half centuries since the beginning of the 
recognizably modern West, it is time to consider again how the Christian can participate 
in the politics of this world while remaining true, in an ultimate sense, to the One True 
Ruler of all the kingdoms of the world. Perhaps the terrible period of history known as 
the Thirty Years’ War, along with its outcomes, can provide useful soil for considering 
how the Church of today can be “salt and light” in society once again. 
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